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ABSTRACT 
Eyewitnesses are often asked in real-world cases whether their lineup responses were 
affected by various external influences, but it is unknown whether they can accurately answer 
these questions. Two experiments used a new paradigm to examine eyewitnesses' abilities to 
estimate the influence of lineup manipulations. Eyewitnesses were administered either 
confirming feedback or no feedback (Experiment 1, n = 103), or a cautionary instruction or 
no cautionary instruction (Experiment 2, n = 114). Eyewitnesses then gave actual responses 
(retrospective confidence, view, and attention measures in Experiment 1 ; identification 
decision in Experiment 2) as well as counterfactual responses stating how they would have 
responded in the alternative condition. Results across both studies showed an asymmetric 
estimation of influence pattern: Eyewitnesses who received an influencing manipulation 
estimated significantly less of a change in their responses than eyewitnesses who did not 
receive an influencing manipulation. A 48-hr delay between actual and counterfactual 
responses did not moderate any effects. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are an eyewitness to a crime, brought into a police station to attempt 
a lineup identification. You identify lineup member #3, after which the lineup administrator 
tells you "Good! That's our suspect!" You then tell the administrator that you are 90% 
confident that #3 is, in fact, the criminal. Based on your identification, formal charges are 
brought against #3. Months later, at trial, the defense attorney for the suspect argues to the 
judge that, because the lineup administrator told you that you had identified the suspect 
before you gave a confidence statement, you were unduly influenced and thus your 
confidence in your identification should be suppressed. The judge, not wanting to completely 
dismiss your confidence statement, tells the defense attorney that if there is concern over 
whether you were influenced, that he should simply ask you at trial whether the fact that you 
were told that you identified the suspect influenced your confidence statement. You are asked 
this question and you begin to think. What confidence statement would you have given had 
you not been told that you identified the suspect? Would you have still been 90% confident? 
If this statement boosted your confidence, by how much did it boost it? Can you accurately 
report on whether, and how, the lineup administrator's statement influenced you? 
Most eyewitness experts, and other psychologists familiar with the shortcomings of 
human memory and its reconstructive processes, would probably express skepticism about 
eyewitnesses' abilities to accurately answer these questions. It is, in fact, largely this 
skepticism that has tended to lead eyewitness researchers to focus on preventing eyewitness 
errors from occurring in the first place. Relatively little research has been devoted towards 
developing techniques to separate accurate from inaccurate witnesses after the identification 
has been made, as such techniques are difficult to come by. Witness variables, for example, 
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such as confidence generally are not highly related to accuracy, thus limiting their usefulness 
as criteria for separating accurate from inaccurate witnesses (Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 
1995). Although decision time has been shown to be a stronger and more reliable postdictor 
of eyewitness accuracy than confidence (i.e., quick decisions are more likely to be accurate 
than slower decisions), it is nonetheless not reliable enough to use in the real world (Sporer, 
1992; Weber, Brewer, Wells, Semmler, & Yeast, 2003). The lack of criteria that are highly 
diagnostic of a witness's accuracy means that individual jurors tend not to be able to 
differentiate accurate from inaccurate witnesses (Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979). Thus, 
to obviate the problem of separating accurate from inaccurate witnesses, most eyewitness 
research has been aimed at developing techniques that minimize the absolute number of 
inaccurate witnesses, an approach known as the system-variable approach (Wells, 1978). 
System-variable research has been largely successful, identifying many lineup 
practices that create inaccurate witnesses through unnecessary influence. Ideally, a lineup 
identification should be based solely on the witness's memory of the criminal. However, 
many real-world lineup techniques lead (or at least allow) witnesses to incorporate extra-
memorial factors in their identifications. For example, lineup administrator-induced 
expectations about the presence or absence of the criminal within a lineup can dramatically 
change the likelihood that witnesses will identify someone from a lineup (Malpass & Devine, 
1981; Phillips, McAuliff, Kovera, & Cutler, 1999). In order to counter such undue influence, 
techniques such as the double-blind lineup (in which the administrator does not know the 
identity of the suspect) have been recommended (Wells et al., 1998). Despite this emphasis 
among eyewitness researchers to develop lineup techniques that avoid unduly influencing the 
witness, however, the legal system has been reluctant to incorporate many of these ideas into 
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its practices. Although this reluctance probably stems from a number of factors, one such 
cause may be the implicit assumption inherent within the legal system that witnesses can 
accurately report on how certain variables influenced them. If this assumption is true, then 
proper lineup techniques that minimize influence on witnesses are not as important; the court 
can always ask witnesses whether (and how) they were influenced by various variables and 
thus 'undo' the effects of influence. However, if this assumption is false, then the legal 
system's trust in witnesses' self-reports of influence is misplaced and, to the extent that it 
reduces the perceived need for proper lineup reforms, counterproductive. 
The legal system's reliance on witnesses' self-reports is pervasive and often implicit. 
In an important case, Neil v. Biggers (1972), the Supreme Court outlined five variables that 
should be taken into consideration when determining the accuracy of an eyewitness. Three of 
those variables - how confident the witness is in the identification, how good a view the 
witness had of the criminal, and how much attention the witness paid to the criminal - rely 
exclusively on self-reports by the witness. All three of these self-reports have been shown to 
be affected by various aspects of the lineup procedure (notably, post-identification feedback; 
Wells & Bradfield, 1998). Thus, the implicit assumption of the legal system is that witnesses 
can give accurate self-reports by 'undoing' any potential influence created by various aspects 
of the lineup procedure. To the extent that witnesses cannot undo any such effects, the 
criteria handed down in Neil v. Biggers are inadequate in determining the accuracy of 
witnesses. 
In fact, the general assumption that witnesses can accurately report on how they were 
influenced (henceforth called the accurate report assumption) is actually a collection of more 
specific assumptions. First, it assumes that witnesses consciously notice the influencing 
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variable in the first place. A variable that is shown to influence a witness may be subtle 
enough to not even be consciously perceived by witnesses. For example, although 
experimenter beliefs about the identity of a criminal have been shown to influence witnesses' 
confidence in their identifications, witnesses often tend to be unaware of having perceived 
any influencing information (Garrioch & Brimacombe, 2001). 
Second, given that witnesses consciously notice the influencing variable, the accurate 
report assumption assumes that witnesses can remember, at a later time, the presence of the 
influencing variable. Because real-world eyewitnesses are generally asked at trial (usually 
many months following the identification itself) about the lineup procedure, memory for 
specific lineup procedures is likely to have degraded. It has been shown that witnesses forget 
various aspects of a lineup procedure (Rose, Bull, Vrij, 2005) and thus the assumption that 
eyewitnesses can remember specific lineup procedures over time is questionable. 
Third, given that witnesses both consciously noticed and remembered a specific 
influencing variable, the accurate report assumption assumes that witnesses can determine 
whether a variable had an influence on them. Witnesses may claim that an influencing 
variable did not influence them, or may claim that a noninfluencing variable did influence 
them. For example, Wells, Olson, and Charman (2003) either gave witnesses confirming 
feedback ("Good. You identified the suspect.") or did not give witnesses this feedback 
following a lineup identification. Although confidence was significantly higher for those 
witnesses who received confirming feedback, those who later claimed that their confidence 
was influenced by the feedback were in reality no more influenced than witnesses who later 
claimed that their confidence was not influenced by the feedback. Thus, witnesses showed no 
ability to accurately determine whether post-identification feedback influenced them. 
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Witnesses' determinations about influence may not be based on direct knowledge of the 
impact of the variable, but rather on implicit theories: their beliefs (accurate or not) about 
how certain variables affect people in general (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wilson, Centerbar, & 
Brekke, 2002). Whether witnesses show any ability to determine the consequences of 
influencing variables apart from these implicit theories is unknown. 
Fourth, given that witnesses consciously notice the influencing variable, remember it 
having been present, and determine that the variable had an influence on them, the accurate 
report assumption assumes that witnesses can accurately estimate the effect of the 
influencing variable by assessing its direction and magnitude of influence. Although 
witnesses may accurately report that a certain variable influenced them, they may tend to 
overestimate or underestimate its influence, or even estimate that it influenced their response 
in a direction opposite its actual influence. For example, it is commonly thought that giving 
witnesses the pre-lineup instruction that "the criminal may have changed appearance since 
the time of the crime" will increase eyewitness accuracy, an assumption that led to its 
inclusion in a formal set of guidelines concerning the collection of eyewitness evidence 
(Technical Working Group, 1999). However, this instruction has been shown to reduce 
eyewitness accuracy (Charman & Wells, in press). To the extent that witnesses have the same 
implicit theory about the effects of the appearance-change instruction, their estimates of the 
influence of the instruction will be in a direction opposite that of its actual influence. 
A substantial body of literature casts doubt on people's abilities to determine whether 
their judgments, attitudes, or behaviors were influenced by an extraneous variable, as well as 
their abilities to correct for any such influence (Petty & Wegener, 1993; Stapel, Martin, & 
Schwarz, 1998; Wilson & Brekke, 1994). According to many of these researchers, when 
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people think that they have been influenced (oftentimes referred to as having been "biased" 
or "contaminated") and attempt to correct for that influence, they tend to use their implicit 
theories (oftentimes referred to as "lay theories" or "naïve theories") about how the 
influencing variable would have affected them (Petty & Wegener, 1993; Wegener & Petty, 
1997; Wilson et al., 2002; for a different view, see Martin & Stapel, 1998). If these implicit 
theories do not reflect the actual influence of a variable, people will often undercorrect, 
overcorrect, or unnecessarily correct (i.e., 'correct' for influence that never existed in the first 
place) for the perceived influence (Petty & Wegener, 1993; Stapel et al., 1998). Given the 
general consensus within the literature that people have little ability to accurately correct for 
influence, there is little reason to believe that eyewitnesses will be able to do so. 
Nonetheless, given the lack of research within the eyewitness literature on correctly 
estimating the influence of lineup manipulations, the current experiments test the validity of 
the four assumptions that make up the accurate report assumption in order to determine 
whether witnesses can accurately report on whether, and to what extent, they were influenced 
by specific variables. In order to test these assumptions, two different influencing variable 
manipulations were used. The influencing variables were chosen according to two criteria. 
To determine whether witnesses could accurately report on how they were influenced, it was 
of course necessary to choose variables that reliably influence witnesses' responses. Thus, 
the first criterion was that the influencing variables had to have been shown repeatedly in 
previous literature to have demonstrable influencing effects. Also, for the sake of 
generalizability, it was important in these studies to assess whether the accuracy of 
witnesses' reports depended on the type of response that was influenced. It may be, for 
example, that witnesses can accurately report on how their confidence in their identifications 
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is influenced by a given variable, but cannot accurately report on how their actual 
identification choices are influenced. Thus, the second criterion in the selection of 
influencing variables was that the influencing variables chosen should have their primary 
effects on different types of responses. The two influencing variables chosen that meet both 
of these criteria are post-identification feedback and pre-lineup instructions. These are 
discussed in turn. 
It has been shown repeatedly that witnesses who receive confirming feedback 
following an identification later erroneously report having made their identification with 
higher confidence than witnesses who did not receive confirming feedback (Bradfield, Wells, 
& Olson, 2002; Wells & Bradfield, 1998; Wells et al., 2003). The effects of confirming 
feedback on retrospective confidence (i.e., confidence at the time of the identification) tend 
to be quite strong, with effect sizes typically around d = 1 or greater. However, when asked at 
the end of these types of studies whether they were influenced by the feedback, those 
witnesses who said that they were influenced were, on average, no more confident than those 
witnesses who said that they were not influenced (Wells et al., 2003). Upon first glance, this 
appears to demonstrate that witnesses have no ability to accurately report on influencing 
variables. However, there is another interpretation. Due to the between-subjects design of the 
experiment, differences in confidence were only assessed at the group level (as opposed to 
the individual witness level). It is possible, then, that although everyone was influenced by 
the feedback, only those witnesses who said that they were influenced were aware of it. Thus, 
it is possible that at least some witnesses could accurately report on the influence of 
confirming feedback. In order to more fully disambiguate witnesses' accuracy in their reports 
of influencing variables, Experiment 1 examined witnesses' abilities to report on the 
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influence of confirming feedback on their retrospective confidence. Because other self-
reports, such as how good a view witnesses had of the criminal and how much attention they 
paid to the criminal's face, have also been shown to be affected by feedback (Wells & 
Bradfield, 1998), these measures were also assessed in Experiment 1. 
By definition, post-identification feedback is given to a witness following an 
identification. It is possible, however, that witnesses may not be aware that manipulations 
administered after an identification can influence them, but are aware of influencing 
manipulations that occur during or prior to their identification. Experiment 2 used a 
manipulation that occurs prior to a witness being shown a lineup and that exerts its main 
effects on the probability of an identification attempt instead of confidence. It has been 
shown repeatedly that instructions that imply that the criminal is in the lineup significantly 
increase the probability of an identification attempt, and instructions that suggest that the 
criminal may not be in the lineup significantly decrease the probability of an identification 
attempt (Malpass & Devine, 1981; Steblay, 1997). Although there are a number of variations 
of such instructions that have been shown to affect the probability of identification attempts, 
Experiment 2 used the most commonly recommended instruction. Specifically, half the 
witnesses were given the instruction that "the criminal may or may not be in the lineup" (a 
cautionary instruction) and the other half were not given this instruction, suggesting that the 
actual criminal was in the lineup. 
Because the specific conditions under which witnesses will be more or less accurate 
in their reports of influence is unknown, a general test of witnesses' abilities necessitates the 
strategic sampling of multiple influencing manipulations that vary along multiple 
dimensions. Note that the influencing manipulations for the two current experiments differ 
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substantially from each other. First, the two manipulations exert their main effects on 
different measures: retrospective confidence for Experiment 1, and probability of an 
identification attempt for Experiment 2. Second, the timing of the two manipulations differs 
between studies. Administration of post-identification feedback occurs after a lineup 
identification task in Experiment 1, whereas administration of the cautionary instruction 
occurs before a lineup identification task in Experiment 2. Third, the influencing 
manipulations differ in terms of their effect on the accuracy of witnesses' reports. Whereas 
the presence of confirming feedback makes witnesses less accurate in their confidence 
assessments, the presence of the cautionary instruction makes witnesses more accurate in 
their identification decisions. 
Using various influencing manipulations that differ substantially from one another on 
important dimensions provides a strong test of whether eyewitnesses can accurately report on 
how they were influenced. Although the first two specific assumptions of the general 
accurate report assumption (i.e., that witness consciously notice and remember receiving the 
influencing variable) are easily tested, the second two assumptions (i.e., that witnesses can 
determine whether a variable influenced them, and can accurately estimate the effects of 
influence) are somewhat more difficult to test. Because the latter two assumptions had never 
before been adequately addressed in the eyewitness literature, it was necessary to develop a 
novel paradigm to test them. 
The technique employed to test these two assumptions was to have all witnesses give 
not only an actual response to the influence (i.e., retrospective confidence for Experiment 1 
and lineup identification decision for Experiment 2), but also a counterfactual response. The 
term 'counterfactual' refers to an alternate version of the past or present that could have 
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occurred, but did not (Roese & Olson, 1995). Assessing a counterfactual version of the 
present requires a mutable antecedent that, had it been different, could conceivably have led 
to an alternate outcome. Mentally mutating an antecedent can therefore affect judgments of 
causality (Wells & Gavanski, 1989). Interestingly, a number of asymmetries concerning the 
creation and consequences of counterfactuals have arisen in the counterfactual literature. For 
instance, negative outcomes are more likely to lead to the generation of counterfactuals than 
positive outcomes (Landman, 1987; but see also Roese & Olson, 1993); upward 
counterfactuals (describing an alternate state of events that is better than actuality) are 
generated more often following failure than following success outcomes (Markman, 
Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1995); salient antecedent events are more likely to be 
mentally mutated than non-salient antecedent events when generating a counterfactual 
(Landman, 1987); and exceptional events are more likely to be mentally mutated than routine 
events when generating counterfactuals (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). The preponderance of 
asymmetries in the counterfactual literature suggests the possibility of asymmetric 
counterfactual responses in the present experiments. 
In the context of the present experiments, a counterfactual response refers to 
witnesses' reports of how they would have responded had they been in the alternate 
condition. For example, witnesses who received confirming feedback following an 
identification and then reported their retrospective confidence gave a counterfactual response 
of how they think they would have responded to the confidence question had they not 
received the confirming feedback. Similarly, witnesses who did not receive confirming 
feedback following an identification and then reported their retrospective confidence gave a 
counterfactual response of how they think they would have responded to the confidence 
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question had they received the specific confirming feedback that was given to other 
witnesses. Thus, all witnesses gave an actual response to influence (or noninfluence) and a 
counterfactual response to noninfluence (or influence)1. 
The only previously-used paradigm for assessing witnesses' abilities to accurately 
report on the effects of influencing variables involved simply comparing the degree of actual 
influence between those witnesses who claimed they were influenced and those witnesses 
who claimed they were not influenced (Wells & Bradfield, 1998; Wells et al., 2003). The 
advantages of the actual/counterfactual paradigm introduced in this work instead of this 
previous paradigm are threefold. First, by collecting both actual and counterfactual responses 
from witnesses who receive an influencing manipulation and witnesses who do not receive 
an influencing manipulation, the paradigm provides an objective way to compare the 
accuracy of witnesses' counterfactual responses. Logically, if witnesses who receive an 
influencing manipulation can accurately report on the effect of influence, their mean 
counterfactual response should match the mean actual response of witnesses who do not 
receive an influencing manipulation, and vice versa. Although any interpretation of such a 
comparison can only be made at a group level, and not an individual witness level, this 
design at least provides an objective standard against which to compare group performance. 
Second, instead of using a simple "Yes, I was influenced'V'No, I was not influenced" 
judgment, the actual/counterfactual paradigm uses continuous, quantitative outcome 
1 For economy of language, witnesses in the current experiments will be referred to as having received an 
influencing manipulation or as having not received an influencing manipulation throughout the manuscript. This 
may be technically incorrect, as even witnesses who did not receive the influencing manipulation in question 
nonetheless may have been influenced by the absence of that manipulation. What is more precisely meant is 
that witnesses who received an influencing manipulation received additional information about the 
identification, which served to reduce witnesses' uncertainty about their responses, whereas witnesses who did 
not receive an influencing manipulation did not receive this additional information. 
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measures, and can therefore measure the degree to which witnesses claim they were 
influenced. Thus, this paradigm is a more sensitive measure of witnesses' beliefs about 
influence. Additionally, although witnesses in the previous paradigm might have accurately 
reported that they were influenced by a given variable, they might nonetheless have over- or 
underestimated the degree to which they were influenced. Whereas these inaccuracies are 
necessarily obscured within the previous paradigm, they are brought to light using the 
actual/counterfactual paradigm. In fact, the actual/counterfactual paradigm can quantitatively 
measure at a group level exactly how much witnesses over- or underestimate the effects of 
influence. 
Third, asking witnesses directly whether they were influenced, as was done in the 
previous paradigm, may have inadvertently biased the witnesses to respond in a certain way. 
The simple act of asking whether they were influenced may imply to witnesses that the 
experimenter is expecting them to have been influenced and that they should answer that they 
were in fact influenced. Alternatively, witnesses may want to resist feeling as if they were 
manipulated, and consequently may be more likely to respond that they were not influenced. 
Under the actual/counterfactual paradigm, beliefs of influence are assessed by simply asking 
witnesses to re-respond to questions under a different antecedent condition. This technique 
should be less likely to imply that the influencing manipulation should have influenced them, 
and witnesses should give more accurate responses as a result. 
The actual/counterfactual paradigm should provide sensitive comparisons between 
the actual responses of witnesses who receive an influencing manipulation and the 
counterfactual responses of witnesses who do not receive an influencing manipulation (and 
vice versa) to determine the extent to which witnesses can accurately estimate the effect of 
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influence. There were a number of distinct patterns that such data could take; however, there 
were four distinct possibilities that seemed most likely given their theoretical grounding. 
These possibilities are illustrated in the four panels of Figure 1. 
First, at one extreme, if witnesses can accurately estimate the effects of influence, we 
would expect to see a complete cross-over interaction (Panel A: Accurate estimation of 
influence). Witnesses who receive the influencing variable should be able to completely 
'erase' the influence from their minds, and witnesses who do not receive the influencing 
variable should be able to 'add' the influence to their response. Thus the counterfactual 
responses of witnesses who receive the influencing manipulation should exactly match the 
actual responses of witnesses who do not receive the influencing manipulation, and vice 
versa. This complete cross-over interaction is the strong version of the argument that 
witnesses can accurately estimate the effects of influence. 
Second, at the opposite extreme, witnesses may deny that a variable influenced (or 
would have influenced) their responses (Panel B: No estimation of influence). This would 
result in a main effect of the influencing variable, with no main effect of actual versus 
counterfactual response and with no interaction between the two variables. This possibility 
has both theoretical grounding and empirical support. Witnesses may perceive attempts to 
influence them as threats against their freedoms, which, according to psychological reactance 
theory (Brehm, 1966), should lead them to attempt to re-exert their freedoms. One way to 
perceive that they have re-exerted their freedom is by denying the effect of influence. 
Additionally, people generally like to believe that their choices are under their own control, 
and may consequently tend to dismiss the idea that external influences affected their behavior 
(Langer, 1975; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Wegner, 2003). 
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More generally, as previously discussed, people seem to have little or no direct 
introspective access to higher order cognitive processes (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). In their 
classic studies, Nisbett and Wilson found that participants would often claim to have been 
influenced by variables that did not influence them, and would often claim to have not been 
influenced by variables that did influence them. It was argued that the participants' claims of 
influence were based on implicit causal theories about how variables produce certain 
responses. Participants would thus only accurately estimate the effect of influence to the 
extent that their implicit theories were correct. However, because these implicit theories are 
often incorrect, people are generally poor at accurately estimating the effects of influence. 
Empirical research from the eyewitness area in particular has suggested that witnesses 
are unable to estimate the effects of influence. Specifically, witnesses whose identification 
confidence was influenced by postidentification feedback show little ability to undo the 
effect of influence (Semmler, Brewer, & Wells, 2004). This conclusion was reached by 
asking witnesses who had just made an identification and subsequently received 
experimenter feedback to state their current identification confidence (their confidence at 
that moment) and their retrospective identification confidence (their confidence at the time of 
the identification). Because the influencing variable (experimenter feedback) was given after 
the lineup task, witnesses whose confidence was inflated by the feedback and who could 
accurately report on the inflation should have given significantly lower retrospective 
confidence estimates than current confidence estimates. However, in Study 1 of the Semmler 
et al. experiment, witnesses' retrospective confidence reports were not significantly different 
from their current retrospective reports. In fact, witnesses' reports of retrospective confidence 
were highly correlated with their reports of current confidence (r = .83 in Study 1 ; r = .80 in 
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Study 2), suggesting that witnesses based their retrospective confidence on their current 
confidence. Thus, it seems that witnesses were not able to undo the influence of the 
experimenter feedback. 
Somewhere between the two extremes (accurate estimation of influence and no 
estimation of influence) is a third possibility: Witnesses may underestimate the effects of 
influence (Panel C: Underestimation of influence). In this case, we would expect to see an 
interaction that is not a complete cross-over. In other words, witnesses who receive the 
influencing variable should be able to only partially (but not fully) 'undo' the effects of the 
influencing variable. Similarly, witnesses who do not receive the influencing variable should 
be able to only partially (but not fully) 'add' the effects of the influencing variable. This 
possibility is based in part on the anchoring and adjustment heuristic (Epley & Gilovich, 
2001; Kahnemann & Tversky, 1972). According to this heuristic, when people estimate a 
value, they tend to begin with a known value (an 'anchor'), and adjust from that anchor. 
However, the adjustment tends to be insufficient. Thus, witnesses in the current study may 
anchor on their actual response and adjust insufficiently, leading to an underestimation of 
influence. Some evidence for an underestimation of influence was found in the results of 
Semmler et al. (2004). Although there were no significant differences between witnesses' 
current and retrospective confidence reports following post-identification feedback in Study 
1, witnesses' retrospective confidence reports were slightly (but significantly) lower than 
their current confidence reports following post-identification feedback in Study 2, suggesting 
that witnesses postulated that feedback affected their responses, but underestimated the 
magnitude of that effect. Because an underestimation of influence at least indicates that 
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witnesses are correctly postulating some effect of the influencing manipulation, it is the weak 
version of the argument that witnesses can accurately estimate the effects of influence. 
The most complex interaction pattern is the fourth possibility, which is that the ability 
of witnesses to accurately estimate the effects of influence may depend on the presence or 
absence of the manipulated variable (Panel D: Asymmetric estimation of influence). 
Specifically, witnesses may more readily 'add' the effects of an influencing variable than 
'erase' those effects. This would lead to an asymmetric interaction pattern. This possibility 
has support from two distinct literatures. First, an asymmetric pattern is consistent with 
research on the hindsight bias, which states that once an outcome is known, people tend to 
overestimate the likelihood that they knew that outcome would occur all along (Fischhoff, 
1975; Guilbault, Bryant, Brockway, & Posavac, 2004). Because both of the current 
experiments involve a manipulation that gives more information to witnesses who receive the 
influencing manipulation (i.e., that they identified the actual criminal in Experiment 1; that 
the actual criminal may not be in the lineup in Experiment 2), these witnesses may 
overestimate the likelihood that they would have known that information anyway when 
generating counterfactual responses. Thus, these witnesses may tend to think that even if they 
had not received confirming feedback, they would have 'known' that they identified the 
criminal, or even if they had not received the cautionary instruction, they would have known 
that the criminal may not be in the lineup. This hindsight bias should mitigate witnesses' 
ability to accurately 'erase' the effects of the influencing variable, and consequently they 
should tend to underestimate the influence. Witnesses who do not receive the influencing 
manipulation, on the other hand, should not exhibit any hindsight bias because they do not 
receive any extra information until they are asked to generate their counterfactual responses. 
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According to this possibility, witnesses who do not receive the influencing manipulation 
should therefore estimate a greater, and more accurate, effect of influence than witnesses 
who do receive the influencing manipulation. 
Second, the asymmetric estimation of influence pattern is also consistent with 
research on counterfactual thinking. Specifically, it has been found that framing 
counterfactuals in terms of mental addition, in which people must assess whether an 
alternative antecedent would produce a greater outcome, has a greater impact than framing 
counterfactuals in terms of mental subtraction, in which people must assess whether an 
alternative antecedent would produce a lesser outcome (Dunning & Parpal, 1989). Although 
the current experiments do not explicitly frame counterfactuals in terms of either mental 
addition or mental subtraction, it is possible that witnesses may interpret the counterfactual 
questions in such a way. Witnesses who do not receive the influencing manipulation may 
estimate how they would have responded had they instead received the influencing 
manipulation by self-generating an additive frame (e.g., "Had I gotten confirming feedback, 
how much more confident would I be?"). Conversely, witnesses who receive the influencing 
manipulation may estimate how they would have responded had they not received the 
influencing manipulation by self-generating a subtractive frame (e.g., "Had I not gotten 
confirming feedback, how much less confident would I be?"). If witnesses do in fact self-
generate these frames, witnesses who do not receive an influencing manipulation should 
estimate a greater effect of influence than witnesses who do receive an influencing 
manipulation. Thus, although the mechanisms driving the asymmetry are different, research 
into both the hindsight bias and counterfactual thinking predict that witnesses who do not 
receive the influencing manipulation should give greater estimates of the effect of influence 
than witnesses who do receive the influencing manipulation. 
Note that regardless of the witness response measure in question, the logic behind 
these possible patterns of results holds. Thus, the different dependent variables that were 
used in the current experiments could each show any of these four patterns. Although 
patterns of data other than the four listed here are possible, these have the strongest 
theoretical grounding. It should also be noted that although the reasoning behind each of 
these four possibilities is independent of the specific type of influence that is manipulated, it 
is also possible that different patterns of results could occur for different influence 
manipulations. For example, it is possible to find that witnesses underestimate the influence 
of confirming feedback but asymmetrically estimate the influence of the cautionary 
instruction. These potential differences in results could be due to differences in witnesses' 
implicit theories about how different influencing variables should influence them (Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977; Wegener & Petty, 1997). For example, if witnesses have an implicit theory 
that post-identification feedback influences confidence judgments, then they may be more 
likely to report that they would have responded differently had they received (or not 
received) such feedback. However, if witnesses do not have an implicit theory that the 
cautionary instruction influences the probability of attempting an identification, they may be 
less likely to report that they would have responded differently. Thus, similar patterns of 
results across influencing manipulations should not necessarily be expected. 
Witnesses' abilities to accurately report on the effects of influencing variables rely 
heavily on their memories of the effects of the influencing variable. Although memory for a 
particular response may persist for a substantial period of time, memory for the cognitive 
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processes that led to that particular response may not. If the accuracy of witnesses' 
counterfactual responses relies on their abilities to 'retrace' their cognitive processes, time 
delay should harm the accuracy of their counterfactual responses. Thus, a time delay 
manipulation between witnesses' actual responses and their counterfactual responses was 
also included in the design of the current experiments. Some witnesses gave their 
counterfactual responses immediately following their actual responses whereas other 
witnesses gave their counterfactual responses 48 hours after their actual responses. The time 
delay only affected witnesses' counterfactual responses; their actual responses were always 
given immediately following the mock crime. Including a delay condition allows analyses of 
witnesses' memories for the influencing variable (which were assessed through recall and 
recognition questions) as well as of witnesses' memories for their original responses to the 
lineup. However, because what is of interest is the effect of time delay on witnesses' abilities 
to retrace their cognitive processes that led to their actual responses, and not the memories 
for the actual responses themselves, all participants in the current experiments, regardless of 
delay condition, were shown their actual responses prior to generating their counterfactual 
responses. Any effect of time delay on counterfactual responses was therefore not 
confounded with witnesses' memories for their actual responses. If such a delay does, in fact, 
harm witnesses' abilities to retrace their cognitive processes and consequently their abilities 
to accurately estimate the effects of influence, then no-delay witnesses should estimate 
greater effects of influence (as assessed through the interaction) than delay witnesses. 
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EXPERIMENT 1: POST-IDENTIFICATION FEEDBACK 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were drawn from the research pool of undergraduate psychology students 
at Iowa State University. All participants received course credit for their participation. One 
hundred and seventeen participants served as mock witnesses. Fourteen participants' data 
could not be used for various reasons (eight delay participants did not return 48 hours later to 
complete the study; data from two participants had to be thrown out due to experimenter 
error, four participants expressed previous knowledge about the study), leaving 103 
participants in the experiment. 
Design and Overview 
Experiment 1 was a 2 (feedback: confirming vs. none) X 2 (response: actual vs. 
counterfactual) X 2 (timing of counterfactual response: immediate vs. delayed) mixed 
factorial design, with feedback and timing of counterfactual response being between-subjects 
variables, and response being a within-subjects variable. All participants engaged in the 
following order of tasks: They witnessed a mock crime, attempted an identification of the 
criminal from a lineup, received either confirming feedback or no feedback about their 
decision, responded to testimony-relevant questions (concerning their retrospective 
confidence, their view of the criminal, and the amount of attention paid to the criminal; these 
are participants' actual responses), answered questions about their memory for the feedback 
they were given (if any) and for their actual responses, and reported how they would have 
answered the confidence, view, and attention questions had they been in the alternative 
feedback condition (participants' counterfactual responses). Participants in the delay 
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condition experienced a 48-hour delay before answering questions about their memory for 
influence and giving their counterfactual responses. 
Materials 
Mock crime. Participants viewed a mock crime approximately 45 seconds long. The 
video showed a male fiddling with a bomb on the roof of a campus building. The video 
focuses on the criminal for a few seconds, after which the criminal realizes he is being 
watched and escapes down a hallway. The criminal's face is visible on at least three 
occasions. 
Lineups. All participants viewed the same lineup that did not contain the criminal. 
The lineup was composed of six pictures of males who were similar in appearance to the 
criminal. Lineup members were shown straight-on from the shoulders up in a simultaneous 2 
(down) X 3 (across) display. Each picture measured approximately 2 inches by 3 inches and 
the lineup was shown to each participant at a distance of approximately two feet. 
Procedure 
Participants were brought into the lab either individually or in groups of two, but 
viewed the mock crime and lineups individually. Participants were randomly assigned to 
both feedback and delay conditions. Upon entering the lab, participants signed a consent 
form and were told that they would be watching a short video of some people and that we 
were interested in their impressions of these people. They were led individually to private 
cubicles and were seated in front of a computer. The experimenter began the mock crime 
video and left the room. Immediately following the video, the experimenter returned and 
informed participants (henceforth called 'witnesses') that they were now witnesses to a crime 
and asked them to attempt to make an identification from a photo lineup. The experimenter 
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showed witnesses a six-person lineup that did not contain the actual criminal. Criminal-
absent lineups were used for two reasons: First, to ensure that all witnesses were inaccurate 
and thus to eliminate any noise associated with having a mixture of accurate and inaccurate 
witnesses, and second, to maximize the effect of post-identification feedback, which has been 
shown to have stronger effects for inaccurate witnesses than accurate witnesses (Bradfield et 
al., 2002). Because it was important to have all witnesses make an identification, the 
experimenter instructed witnesses to "select the person who you think planted the bomb on 
the roof." This instruction has been shown to cause almost all witnesses to identify someone 
from a lineup (Wells & Bradfield, 1998). If a witness failed to make an identification, the 
experimenter told the witness "I need you to try and identify the bomber." 
Following the lineup identification, the experimenter gave either confirming feedback 
("Good, you identified the suspect") or no feedback to witnesses, depending on the specific 
witness's condition. Witnesses then responded to questions about their retrospective 
confidence in their identification, how good a view they had of the criminal, and how much 
attention they paid to the criminal's face (see Appendix A for exact wording of the questions 
that witnesses received). Confirming feedback has been shown to affect witnesses' responses 
on all three of these measures (Wells & Bradfield, 1998); these were witnesses' actual 
responses. Witnesses in the no-delay condition immediately proceeded with the rest of the 
experiment; witnesses in the delay condition were excused at this point and reminded to 
return 48 hours later. When delay witnesses returned, they followed the exact same 
procedure as no-delay witnesses. 
Witnesses were then given questions concerning their memory for the influence and 
for their actual responses (see Appendix B for the exact wording of the questions that were 
asked of witnesses who received confirming feedback and who did not receive confirming 
feedback). Specifically, witnesses were asked 1) to give an open-ended response as to what 
the experimenter had told them immediately following their identification (the cued recall 
question); 2) to choose, from a list of five options, which statement the experimenter had 
given them immediately following the identification (the recognition question); 3) to select 
whether the statement that the experimenter gave them (if they were given a statement) 
occurred before or after they responded to the confidence question; and 4) to re-respond from 
memory how they had originally responded to the confidence, view, and attention questions. 
Once witnesses responded to each question, they were told what the correct response was, 
and were only then allowed to see the next question. 
Participants were then shown both the lineup and their original responses to the 
confidence, view, and attention questions, were instructed to imagine that they were in the 
alternative feedback condition, and were asked to respond to those questions as if they had 
been in the alternative condition (see Appendix C for the exact wording of the instructions 
that were given to participants who were given confirming feedback and who were not given 
confirming feedback). These were witnesses' counterfactual responses. Following 
completion of these questions, all participants were debriefed and excused. 
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Results 
Overview 
Only two participants (1.9%) did not immediately make an identification from the 
lineup. However, both participants made an identification after the additional prompt by the 
experimenter (to "try and identify the bomber"), and thus their data are included in all 
analyses. To answer the question of whether witnesses are able to accurately report on the 
effects of confirming post-identification feedback, data analyses are broken down into two 
main sections. The first section examines witnesses' memories for the feedback and for their 
actual responses. This is ascertained by examining 1) whether witnesses can recall what sort 
of feedback, if any, they received (as ascertained through their responses to open-ended 
questions); 2) whether witnesses can recognize what the experimenter told them immediately 
following their identification (as ascertained through their responses to multiple-choice 
questions); and 3) whether witnesses can remember how they originally answered the actual 
confidence, view, and attention questions. Time delay was also examined as a possible 
moderator of any effects. 
The second section examines witnesses' abilities to determine whether they were 
influenced by, and to estimate the effects of, confirming feedback. This was done by 
comparing the counterfactual responses given by witnesses who received confirming 
feedback to the actual responses made by witnesses who did not receive feedback (and vice 
versa). These comparisons were used to determine 1) whether witnesses show any ability to 
accurately estimate the effects of influence, 2) whether the estimation of influence is equal 
for witnesses who received confirming feedback and witnesses who did not receive 
confirming feedback, and 3) whether witnesses tended to overestimate, underestimate, or 
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accurately estimate the effects of confirming feedback. Time delay was also examined as a 
possible moderator of estimates of influence. 
Did witnesses notice and remember the confirming feedback and their actual responses? 
Open-ended responses. Witnesses' responses to open-ended questions concerning 
what they were told immediately following their identification were content-analyzed for 
whether they reported having received some sort of confirmation about their identification 
decision. Two raters independently analyzed each witness's response; the two raters agreed 
on 100% of the responses. Of witnesses who received confirming feedback, 80.8% correctly 
reported in the open-ended responses that they received some sort of experimenter 
confirmation of their identification. Witnesses in the delay condition, who answered this 
question 48-hours after having received feedback, did not significantly differ in their 
likelihood of reporting having received confirming feedback from witnesses in the no-delay 
condition (80% vs. 81%, respectively), ^ (1) = .02,p = .89, -.37 <d< ,412. Two witnesses 
(3.9%) in the no-feedback condition reported having received some sort of confirmation of 
their identification from the experimenter. 
Multiple choice recognition responses. Overall, 90.3% of witnesses correctly selected 
from a list of five options what the experimenter had told them immediately following their 
identification. This did not vary significantly as a function of whether witnesses received 
feedback, x{\) = 1.69, p = .19, -.13 <d< .65, or as a function of delay, %2(1) = 3.38, p = .07, 
-.02 <d< .76, although the latter approached significance with a somewhat greater 
2 In order to use a common metric, all effect sizes throughout the manuscript have been converted to Cohen's d, 
which was defined as a small, medium, and large effect size for d = .20, .50, and .80, respectively (Cohen, 
1988). In addition, 95% confidence intervals were constructed around all effect sizes. 
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proportion of witnesses in the no-delay condition (14.8%) selecting an incorrect option than 
witnesses in the delay condition (4.0%). 
Of those witnesses who received confirming feedback, 65.4% recalled having 
received the feedback before answering the question about their confidence. The remaining 
34.6% of witnesses incorrectly reported having received the feedback after answering the 
question about their confidence. This did not vary significantly as a function of delay, j2(l) = 
.15,p = .70, -.46 <d< .62. 
Remembered responses. Although not a main focus of the study, the possibility that 
delay or feedback influenced witnesses' memories for their initial responses was also 
examined. If, indeed, this is the case, then witnesses' abilities to estimate the effects of 
confirming feedback may depend on their memories for their own initial responses. 
However, paired samples t-tests indicated that witnesses' remembered reports did not differ 
significantly from their actual reports on any of the three variables: £(102) = 1.00, p = .32, 
- . 0 7  < d <  .  4 7  f o r  c o n f i d e n c e ;  £ ( 1 0 2 )  =  . 2 1 ,  p  =  . 8 3 ,  - . 2 3  <  d  <  . 3 1  f o r  v i e w ;  £ ( 1 0 2 )  =  1 . 0 9 , p  =  
.28, -.05 < d < .49 for attention. Difference scores were then calculated by subtracting 
witnesses' actual responses to the confidence, view, and attention measures from their 
respective remembered responses to these measures. These differences scores equaled the 
degree to which witnesses misremembered their initial responses. A 2 (delay vs. no delay) by 
2 (confirming feedback vs. no confirming feedback) ANOVA was conducted on each one of 
these difference scores. Delay did not affect the degree to which witnesses misremembered 
their responses to any of the three measures: F(l, 99) = .03, p = .87, -.39 < d < .39 for 
c o n f i d e n c e ;  F (  1 ,  9 9 )  =  . 3 8 ,  p  =  . 5 4 ,  - . 2 7  <  d  <  . 5 1  f o r  v i e w ;  F ( l ,  9 9 )  =  . 3 3 ,  p  =  . 5 7 ,  - . 2 9  < d <  
.49 for attention. Feedback also did not affect the degree to which witnesses misremembered 
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their responses to any of the three measures: F( 1, 99) = 1.95, p = .17, -.11 < d < .67 for 
c o n f i d e n c e ;  F ( l ,  9 9 )  =  . 0 4 ,  p  =  . 8 4 ,  - . 3 9  < d <  . 3 9  f o r  v i e w ;  F ( l ,  9 9 )  =  1 . 3 5 ,  p  =  . 2 5 ,  - . 1 7  <  d  
< .61 for attention. Likewise, no interaction between delay and feedback existed for any of 
the three measures: F(l, 99) = .07, p = .80, -.33 < d < .45 for confidence; F(l, 99) = .04, p = 
.85, -.39 < d < .39 for view; F(l, 99) = 2.83, p = .10, -.04 <d< .73 for attention. Thus, 
witnesses tended to be quite accurate when remembering their initial responses, a finding that 
was not moderated by either time delay or feedback. 
Did witnesses accurately estimate the effects of confirming feedback? 
Confidence, view, and attention scores were all significantly correlated with one 
another on both the actual measures and the counterfactual measures (see Table 1). Because 
the feedback effect refers to the distorting effect of feedback across multiple measures, scores 
on these three feedback measures were averaged to create a composite score. Because 
confidence could range from 0 - 100 in 10-point increments, the confidence scale was 
converted to a 10-point scale to match the view and attention scales before the composite 
scores were calculated. All analyses concerning the feedback effect were thus done on this 
composite score as well as on each of the individual measures. Means of all scores are 
displayed in Table 2. Patterns of data are displayed in Figure 2. Because preliminary analyses 
showed no effect of delay, data was initially collapsed across this variable. 
Feedback effect. In order to test whether witnesses can accurately estimate the effects 
of confirming feedback, it must first be shown that feedback indeed had a significant effect 
on witnesses' confidence. Based on the wealth of previous research concerning the feedback 
effect, including a recent meta-analysis (Douglass & Steblay, in press), as well as its 
demonstrated consistency and magnitude, one-tailed tests were used to assess the feedback 
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effect. Witnesses who received confirming feedback showed significantly higher composite 
scores than witnesses who did not receive confirming feedback, f(101) = 2.68, p < .01, .14 < 
d < .92. Looking at the feedback effect for each individual measure revealed that compared 
to witnesses who did not receive confirming feedback, witnesses who received confirming 
feedback reported being significantly more confident, f(101) = 1.86, p = .03, .04 < d < .70; 
having paid significantly more attention to the criminal, r(101) = 2.01, p = .02, .07 < d < .73; 
and having had a better view of the criminal, f(101) = 1.95, p = .03, .06 < d < .72. The typical 
feedback effect was thus replicated in the present study. 
Test of estimation of influence. If witnesses show any ability to accurately estimate 
the effects of feedback, then those witnesses who received feedback should lower their 
counterfactual reports of confidence, view, and attention. Conversely, those witnesses who 
did not receive feedback should increase their counterfactual reports of confidence, view, 
and attention. Thus, any ability of witnesses to accurately estimate for the effects of influence 
should appear as a significant response (actual vs. counterfactual) X feedback (confirming vs. 
none) interaction. A 2 X 2 mixed ANOVA on the composite measure revealed a significant 
interaction, F(l, 101) = 187.08, p < .001, 2.38 < d < 3.14. A significant interaction was also 
present for each of the measures individually: F(l, 101) = 137.1 \,p < .001, 1.98 <d< 2.69 
f o r  c o n f i d e n c e ;  F ( l ,  1 0 1 )  =  8 4 . 3 9 ,  p  <  . 0 0 1 ,  1 . 4 8  < d <  2 . 1 3  f o r  v i e w ;  F ( l ,  1 0 1 )  =  7 6 . 0 6 ,  p  <  
.001, 1.44 < d < 2.08 for attention. The presence of significant interactions across all three 
measures suggests that witnesses estimated that confirming feedback had (or would have 
had) at least some influence on their responses. 
Test of equality of estimation of influence. The previous analysis does not, however, 
indicate whether witnesses who received feedback estimated the effects of feedback to the 
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same degree as witnesses who did not receive feedback. The asymmetric estimation of 
influence hypothesis predicted that witnesses who received the influencing variable (in this 
experiment, confirming feedback) would estimate less of an effect for influence than 
witnesses who did not receive the influencing variable. To test this prediction, difference 
scores were calculated for the composite measure as well as for each of the individual 
measures. This difference score equaled the magnitude of the estimation of influence that 
witnesses made with their counterfactual responses. For the purposes of testing the 
asymmetric estimation of influence hypothesis, what is of interest is not the direction of the 
estimation of influence, but simply its magnitude. Thus, for witnesses who received 
feedback, this difference score was calculated as their actual measure score minus their 
counterfactual measure score. For witnesses who did not receive feedback, this difference 
score was calculated as their counterfactual measure score minus their actual measure score. 
Calculating difference scores in this way generated an absolute difference score that simply 
represents the magnitude of the estimation of influence, regardless of whether that estimation 
was an increase (i.e., for witnesses in the no feedback condition) or a decrease (i.e., for 
witnesses in the feedback condition) in scores. These scores are displayed in Table 3. 
Examining the absolute difference composite scores indicated that, consistent with 
the predicted asymmetric estimation of influence hypothesis, witnesses who received 
confirming feedback estimated significantly less of an effect of feedback than did witnesses 
who did not receive confirming feedback, f(101) = 4.27, p < .001, .45 < d < 1.25. Looking at 
individual measures, witnesses who received confirming feedback estimated significantly 
less of an effect of feedback than witnesses who did not receive confirming feedback on the 
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confidence measure, £(101) = 4.26, p < .001, .45 < d < 1.25; the view measure, f(101) = 2.79, 
p < .01, .17 <d< .95; and the attention measure, ?(101) = 1.96,p = .05, .00 <d< .78. 
There are two possible ways in which witnesses who received confirming feedback 
could have estimated a smaller effect of feedback than witnesses who did not receive 
confirming feedback. First, witnesses who received confirming feedback might simply have 
been less likely to acknowledge any effect at all of feedback (i.e., their counterfactual 
responses would be the same as their actual responses). Alternatively, among those witnesses 
who did acknowledge an effect of feedback, the estimate of the magnitude of the feedback 
effect may have been less among witnesses who received feedback than among witnesses 
who did not receive feedback. Data for these two possibilities are displayed in Table 4 and 
Table 5, respectively. Consistent with the former interpretation, witnesses who received 
confirming feedback were significantly less likely to acknowledge any effect of feedback 
t h a n  w i t n e s s e s  w h o  d i d  n o t  r e c e i v e  c o n f i r m i n g  f e e d b a c k  o n  t h e  c o n f i d e n c e  m e a s u r e ,  x { \ )  =  
3.78,p = .05, .00 <d< .78; the view measure,/2(1) = 9.78, p = .002, .26 < d < 1.05; and the 
attention measure, /2(1) = 5.51, p = .02, .08 < d < .86. Partial support was found for the latter 
interpretation: Looking only at witnesses who acknowledged an effect of feedback revealed 
that witnesses who received confirming feedback estimated the magnitude of the effect to be 
significantly less than witnesses who did not receive confirming feedback on the confidence 
measure, f(81) = 3.70, p < .001, .37 <d< 1.27, but not on either the view measure, t{ 59) = 
.65, p = .52, -.35 <d< .69, or the attention measure, t( 61) = .47, p = .64, -.38 <d< .62. 
Recall that a substantial proportion of witnesses who received confirming feedback 
(34.6%) incorrectly reported having received confirming feedback after having answered the 
confidence question. Because there is no way feedback can influence responses that have 
already been made, these witnesses should have estimated less of an influence of feedback 
than witnesses who correctly reported having received confirming feedback before having 
answered the confidence question. In fact, witnesses' estimates of the influence of 
confirming feedback on their confidence reports did not significantly differ as a function of 
whether they reported having received the feedback before (M = 13.2) versus after (M = 
10.6) having answered the confidence question, f(50) = .84, p = .41, -.33 <d< .81. 
Test of accuracy of estimation. The data indicate that witnesses who received 
confirming feedback estimated the influence of feedback to be significantly less than did 
witnesses who did not receive confirming feedback, but were either of those estimates 
accurate? To assess the accuracy of witnesses' estimates of influence, the counterfactual 
scores of witnesses who received feedback were compared to the actual scores of witnesses 
who did not receive feedback. Similarly, the counterfactual scores of witnesses who did not 
receive feedback were compared to the actual scores of witnesses who did receive feedback. 
If witnesses were accurately estimating for the effects of influence, then these differences 
should be non-significant. 
Using the composite scores as dependent measures revealed that witnesses who 
received feedback did not significantly over- or underestimate the influence of feedback; 
their counterfactual composite score did not differ significantly from the actual composite 
score of witnesses who did not receive feedback, f(101) = .20, p = .84, -.35 <d< .43. 
Looking at measures individually revealed that witnesses who received feedback did not 
significantly over- or underestimate the influence of feedback on any of the three measures: 
/( 101) = .61, p = .54, -.27 < d< .51 for confidence; f(101) = .08, p = .94, -.37 < d< .41 for 
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view; £(101) = .12, p = .90, -.37 < d < .41 for attention. Thus, witnesses who received 
feedback were relatively accurate in their estimates of the influence of feedback. 
In contrast, witnesses who did not receive feedback overestimated the influence of 
feedback on the composite measure; their counterfactual composite score was significantly 
higher than the actual composite score of witnesses who did receive feedback, £(101) = 2.98, 
p < .01, .20<d< .98. Looking at measures individually revealed that witnesses who did not 
receive feedback overestimated the influence of feedback on confidence, £(101) = 3.72, p < 
.001, .34 < d < 1.14. Witnesses did not significantly over- or underestimate the influence of 
feedback on either the view measure, £(101) = 1.60, p = .11, -.07 < d < .71, or the attention 
measure, £(101) = 1.01, p = .31, -.19 < d < .59. 
Test of a moderating influence of time delay. Because all witnesses, regardless of 
delay condition, responded to the confidence, view, and attention questions immediately 
following the administration of feedback, delay could only have affected witnesses' 
counterfactual responses. Thus, to test the moderating effect of time delay, 2 (timing of 
counterfactual responses: delayed vs. immediate) X 2 (feedback: confirming vs. none) 
between-subjects ANOVAs were conducted on the counterfactual responses. Delay had no 
significant main effects on witnesses' counterfactual composite scores, F( 1, 99) = .74, p = 
. 3 9 ,  - . 2 3  < d <  . 5 5 ,  n o r  o n  a n y  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  m e a s u r e s :  F ( l ,  9 9 )  =  . 4 4 ,  p  =  . 5 1 ,  - . 2 7  < d <  
.51 for confidence; F(l, 99) = 1.30, p = .26, -.17 < d < .61 for view; F(l, 99) = .03, p = .85, 
-.39 < d < .39 for attention. Delay also did not significantly interact with feedback on 
witnesses' counterfactual composite scores, F(l, 99) = .78, p = .38, -.21 <d< .57, nor on any 
of the individual measures: F(l, 99) = 1.23, p = .27, -.17 < d < .61 for confidence; F(l, 99) = 
.41,p = .52, -.27 < d < .51 for view; F(l, 99) = .07, p = .79, -.33 < d < .45 for attention. 
However, the previous analyses did not control for witnesses' initial scores on these 
measures; in other words, although they demonstrate that delay did not moderate witnesses' 
counterfactual responses, they do not speak as to whether time delay moderated witnesses' 
estimates of influence. To address this question, the previous analyses were repeated using 
witnesses' absolute difference scores as the dependent variables. Similar to the previous 
results, delay had no significant main effects on witnesses' estimates of the influence of 
feedback on composite scores, F( 1, 99) = .92, p = .34, -.19 < d < .59, nor on any of the 
individual measures: F(l, 99) = 1.55, p = .22, -.15 < d< .63 for confidence; F(l, 99) = .04, p 
= .84, -.39 < d < .39 for view; F(l, 99) = .21, p = .65, -.29 < d < .49 for attention. Delay also 
did not significantly interact with feedback on witnesses' estimates of the influence of 
feedback on composite scores, F(l, 99) = .30, p = .59, -.29 < d < .49, nor on any of the 
individual measures: F(l, 99) = .14, p = .71, -.33 < d < .45 for confidence; F(l, 99) = .03, p = 
.86, -.39 < d < .39 for view; F(l, 99) = 1.09, p = .30, -.17 < d < .61 for attention. Therefore, 
delay did not significantly moderate any of the witnesses' responses. 
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Discussion 
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to determine whether witnesses could accurately 
report on the influence of confirming feedback. This was broken down into two sections. The 
first section tested the assumptions that witnesses noticed, and could remember, the 
confirming feedback. Results supported these assumptions: The majority of witnesses who 
received confirming feedback accurately reported having received confirming feedback, 
effects that were not moderated by a 48-hour time delay. 
The second section tested the assumptions that witnesses could determine whether 
confirming feedback influenced them, and could accurately estimate the influence of 
confirming feedback. Four patterns of data (accurate estimation, no estimation, 
underestimation, asymmetric estimation) were thought to be possible. Results of Experiment 
1 are clearly consistent with the asymmetric estimation of influence hypothesis. Witnesses 
who did not receive confirming feedback estimated the influence of confirming feedback to 
be significantly greater than witnesses who did receive confirming feedback. In other words, 
generating a counterfactual response in which witnesses added the effects of confirming 
feedback had a greater impact than generating a counterfactual response in which witnesses 
subtracted the effects of confirming feedback. This asymmetry on the confidence measure 
resulted from the fact that, compared to witnesses who did not receive confirming feedback, 
witnesses who did receive confirming feedback 1) were less likely to report that confirming 
feedback had (or would have had) any effect whatsoever, and 2) estimated less of an impact 
of confirming feedback among those who did make a correction. The asymmetry on the view 
and attention measures resulted only from the fact that fewer witnesses who received 
confirming feedback reported that the feedback influenced their responses. A 48-hour time 
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delay between providing an actual response and providing a counterfactual response had no 
significant effect on this pattern. 
It had been predicted that such an asymmetry would lead witnesses who received 
confirming feedback to underestimate the impact that confirming feedback had on their 
responses, and witnesses who did not receive feedback to more accurately estimate the 
impact that receiving confirming feedback would have had on their responses. Interestingly, 
the observed results were somewhat different. Witnesses who received confirming feedback 
more accurately estimated the effect of feedback than witnesses who did not receive 
confirming feedback. In fact, as a group, the counterfactual responses of witnesses who 
received confirming feedback were not significantly different from the actual responses of 
witnesses who did not receive feedback, suggesting that they were objectively accurate in 
their estimates of the influence of confirming feedback. In contrast, witnesses who did not 
receive feedback tended, as a group, to overestimate the influence feedback would have had 
on their retrospective confidence responses (but not on their view or attention responses). 
Thus, it appears that the ability of witnesses to accurately estimate the influence of 
confirming feedback is dependent on whether those witnesses actually received feedback or 
not. 
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EXPERIMENT 2: PRE-LINEUP INSTRUCTIONS 
To test whether this observed asymmetric estimation of influence would generalize 
across a different influencing manipulation, Experiment 2 used the same paradigm as 
Experiment 1 using a different influencing variable, namely pre-lineup instructions. 
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Method 
Participants 
Participants were drawn from the research pool of undergraduate psychology students 
at Iowa State University. All participants received course credit for their participation. One 
hundred and forty-one participants served as mock witnesses. Data from eighteen participants 
could not be used for various reasons (sixteen delay participants did not return 48 hours later 
to complete the study; two participants expressed previous knowledge about the study), 
leaving 123 participants in the experiment. 
Design and Overview 
Experiment 2 was a 2 (cautionary instruction: given vs. not given) X 2 (response: 
actual vs. counterfactual) X 2 (timing of counterfactual response: immediate vs. delayed) 
mixed factorial design, with feedback and timing of counterfactual response being between-
subjects variables, and response being a within-subjects variable. All participants engaged in 
the following order of tasks: They witnessed a mock crime, were given either the cautionary 
instruction by the experimenter or not, were asked to attempt an identification of the criminal 
from a lineup (their actual identification response), answered questions about their memory 
for the influence and for their actual responses, and reported how they would have responded 
to the lineup had they been in the alternative instruction condition (their counterfactual 
identification response). Participants in the delay condition experienced a 48-hour delay 
before answering questions about their memory for influence and giving their counterfactual 
responses. 
Materials 
Mock crime and lineup. Both the video of the mock crime and the lineup were 
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identical to those used in Experiment 1. 
Procedure 
Participants were brought into the lab either individually or in groups of two, but 
viewed the mock crime and lineups individually. Participants were randomly assigned to 
both instruction and delay conditions. Participants followed the same general procedure as 
participants in Experiment 1. Following the mock crime, however, participants (now called 
'witnesses') were given one of two instructions. Before viewing the lineup, witnesses 
assigned to the cautionary instruction condition were told to "keep in mind that the actual 
criminal may or may not be in the lineup. Look at the people in the photo lineup and tell me 
if you see the criminal." Witnesses in the no cautionary instruction condition were told to 
"look at the people in the photo lineup and try to identify the criminal you saw in the video." 
Witnesses could then identify a lineup member or choose to identify no one. They were then 
asked about their confidence in their decision. Their responses were recorded by the 
experimenter. No feedback was given to the witnesses following the identification decision. 
Witnesses in the no-delay condition immediately proceeded with the rest of the experiment; 
witnesses in the delay condition were excused at this point and reminded to return 48 hours 
later. When delay witnesses returned, they followed the exact same procedure as no-delay 
witnesses. 
Witnesses were given questions concerning their memory for the influence and for 
their actual responses (see Appendix D for the exact wording of the questions that were 
asked of witnesses who received the cautionary instruction and witnesses who did not receive 
the cautionary instruction). Specifically, witnesses were asked 1) to give an open-ended 
response as to what the experimenter had instructed them immediately before showing them 
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the lineup (the recall question); 2) to choose, from a list of five options, which instruction, if 
any, the experimenter had given them immediately before showing them the lineup (the 
recognition question); and 3) to re-respond from memory how they had originally responded 
to the lineup. After witnesses responded to each question, they were told what the correct 
response was, and were only then allowed to see the next question. 
Witnesses were then shown both the lineup and the sheet on which the experimenter 
had recorded their lineup decision, were instructed to imagine that they were in the 
alternative instruction condition, and were asked to respond to the lineup as if they had been 
in the alternative instruction condition (see Appendix E for the exact wording of the 
instructions that were given to participants who were given the cautionary instruction and 
who were not given the cautionary instruction). These were witnesses' counterfactual 
responses. Following completion of these questions, all participants were debriefed and 
excused. 
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Results 
Overview 
Results are broken down into two sections and are organized in the same format as 
they were for Experiment 1. The first section examines witnesses' memories for the pre-
lineup instruction and for their actual responses. This is ascertained by examining 1) whether 
witnesses can recall what pre-lineup instructions, if any, they received (as ascertained 
through their responses to open-ended questions); 2) whether witnesses can recognize what 
the experimenter told them immediately prior to the identification attempt (as ascertained 
through their responses to multiple-choice questions); and 3) whether witnesses can 
remember how they originally responded to the lineup. Time delay was also examined as a 
possible moderator of any effects. 
The second section examines witnesses' abilities to determine whether they were 
influenced by, and whether they could accurately estimate, the influence of the cautionary 
instruction. This was done by comparing the actual responses of witnesses who received the 
cautionary instruction to the counterfactual responses of witnesses who did not receive the 
cautionary instruction (and vice versa). The comparisons were used to determine 1) whether 
witnesses show any ability to accurately estimate the effects of influence, 2) whether 
estimates of the effect of influence are equal for witnesses who received the cautionary 
instruction and witnesses who did not receive the cautionary instruction, and 3) whether 
witnesses tended to overestimate, underestimate, or accurately estimate the influence of pre-
lineup instructions. Finally, time delay was examined as a possible moderator of any 
estimations of influence. 
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Did witnesses notice and remember the cautionary instruction and their actual responses? 
Open-ended responses. Witnesses' responses to open-ended questions concerning 
what instructions they were given immediately before being shown the lineup were content-
analyzed for whether they reported receiving a cautionary instruction that the criminal may 
not be in the lineup. Two raters independently analyzed each witness's response; the two 
raters agreed on 100% of the responses. Of witnesses who received the cautionary 
instruction, 82.5% correctly reported having been instructed that the criminal may not be in 
the lineup. Witnesses in the delay condition, who answered this question 48-hours after 
having received the instruction were as likely to report having received a cautionary 
instruction (74%) as witnesses in the no-delay condition (89%),/2(l) = 2.35, p = .13, -.08 < d 
< .64. One person (1.7%) in the no instruction condition reported having received an 
instruction that the criminal may not be in the lineup. 
Multiple choice recognition responses. Overall, 84.6% of witnesses correctly selected 
from a list of five options the instruction that was given to them. This did not vary 
significantly as a function of either instruction, %2(1) = .02, p = .89, -.33 <d< .37, or delay, 
/(!) = 1.21,p = .27,-.16<d<.56. 
Remembered responses. Overall, 98.4% of witnesses correctly remembered their 
identification decision. This did not vary significantly as a function of delay, %2(1) = .04, p = 
.84, -.32 <d< .40. Difference scores, which equaled the degree to which witnesses 
misremembered their confidence, were calculated by subtracting witnesses' reported 
confidence from their remembered confidence. These difference scores did not differ 
significantly from zero, indicating that witnesses' reported confidence in their identification 
did not differ significantly from their subsequent remembered confidence, £(122) = 1.47, p = 
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.15, .22 < d <  .32. In fact, actual confidence and remembered confidence were highly 
correlated, r = .98, p < .001. The difference scores did not differ significantly as a function of 
delay, f(121) = .85, p = .40, -.21 < d < .51 or instructions, t( 121) = .66, p = .51, -.23 <d< .47. 
Thus, witnesses tended to be quite accurate when remembering their initial responses, a 
finding that was not moderated by time delay or instructions. 
Did witnesses accurately estimate the effects of instructions? 
Proportions of correct lineup rejections (i.e., "not there" responses) as a function of 
condition are displayed in Table 6. Patterns of data are displayed in Figure 3. 
Instruction effect. In order to test whether witnesses can accurately estimate the 
effects of the cautionary instruction, it must first be shown that the instruction indeed had a 
significant effect on witnesses' identification decisions. Consistent with past research, the 
cautionary instruction to "keep in mind that the criminal may or may not be present in the 
lineup" led to more correct "not there" responses (47.6%) than an instruction that did not 
include this phrase (6.6%),/2(1) = 25.77, p < .001, .66 < d < 1.41. 
Test of estimation of influence. Given that the previous analysis demonstrated that 
instructions indeed influenced identification decisions, if witnesses show any ability to 
accurately estimate the effects of the cautionary instruction, then some proportion of 
witnesses who received the cautionary instruction and subsequently rejected the lineup (i.e., 
said "not there") should report that had they instead not received the cautionary instruction 
they would have made an identification. Conversely, some proportion of witnesses who did 
not receive the cautionary instruction and made an identification should report that had they 
instead received the cautionary instruction they would have rejected the lineup. Therefore, 
any tendency to accurately estimate the effects of the cautionary instruction should appear as 
a significant response (actual vs. counterfactual) X instruction (cautionary vs. no cautionary) 
interaction. Because all identifications were incorrect, no distinction was made between 
witnesses who identified different lineup members; all witnesses were classified as either 
having made an identification or having rejected the lineup. Consistent with the idea that 
witnesses were at least partially estimating for the effects of the cautionary instruction, this 
interaction was significant, z = 8.09, p < .001. 
Test of equality of estimation of influence. The asymmetric estimation of influence 
hypothesis predicted that witnesses who receive a manipulation (in this experiment, a 
cautionary instruction) should estimate less of an influence than should witnesses who do not 
receive a manipulation. To test this prediction, a chi-square test was performed on the 
percentage of witnesses who gave a counterfactual response that was different from their 
actual response and in the direction of actual influence. Consistent with the predicted 
asymmetric estimation of influence hypothesis, witnesses who received the cautionary 
instruction were less likely to change their response (30.2%) than witnesses who did not 
receive the cautionary instruction (46.7%), although this effect fell slightly short of attaining 
statistical significance,/2(1) = 3.55,p = .06, -.01 <d< .70. 
Test of accuracy of estimation. If witnesses can accurately estimate the effects of the 
cautionary instruction, then the proportion of witnesses who received the cautionary 
instruction and rejected the lineup should not differ significantly from the proportion of 
witnesses who did not receive the cautionary instruction, but report that they would have 
rejected the lineup had they received the cautionary instruction. Similarly, the proportion of 
witnesses who did not receive the cautionary instruction and rejected the lineup should not 
differ significantly from the proportion of people who received the cautionary instruction, but 
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report that they would have rejected the lineup had they not received the cautionary 
instruction. In fact, witnesses who received the cautionary instruction underestimated the 
influence of the instruction; they were more likely than witnesses who did not receive the 
cautionary instruction to report that they would have rejected the lineup (20.6% vs. 6.7%, 
respectively),/2(1) = 5.03, p = .03, .05 < d < .77. In contrast, those witnesses who did not 
receive the cautionary instruction did not significantly over- or underestimate the influence of 
the cautionary instruction; they were as likely as witnesses who actually received the 
cautionary instruction to report that they would have rejected the lineup (53.3% vs. 47.6%, 
respectively),/2(1) = .40,p = .53, -.23 <d< .47. 
Test of a moderating influence of time delay. Because all witnesses, regardless of 
delay condition, responded to the lineup immediately on Day 1, delay could only have 
affected witnesses' counterfactual responses. Thus, to determine whether delay significantly 
affected witnesses' counterfactual responses, a 2 (counterfactual responses: delayed vs. not 
delayed) X 2 (cautionary instruction: given vs. not given) chi-square test was conducted on 
the counterfactual responses. Delay did not significantly affect the proportion of witnesses 
who reported that they would have rejected the lineup, %2(1) = .37, p = .54, -.26 <d< .46, nor 
did it significantly interact with instruction, z = 1.29, p = .10. Delay also had no significant 
effect on the likelihood that witnesses would correctly change their responses, %2(1) = .01, p 
= .93, -.34 <d< .38. Therefore, time delay did not significantly moderate any of the 
witnesses' responses. 
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Discussion 
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to determine whether witnesses could accurately 
report on the influence of the cautionary instruction, and more specifically, whether the 
results of Experiment 1 - in particular the asymmetric estimation of influence pattern -
would generalize to a pre-lineup instruction manipulation. This question was broken down 
into two sections. The first section tested the assumptions that witnesses noticed, and could 
remember, the cautionary instruction and their initial lineup responses. Results supported 
these assumptions; the majority of witnesses who received the cautionary instruction 
accurately reported having received an instruction that the criminal may or may not be in the 
lineup, an effect that was not moderated by a 48-hour time delay. 
The second section tested the assumptions that witnesses could determine whether the 
cautionary instruction influenced them, and could accurately estimate the influence of the 
cautionary instruction. Results of Experiment 2 are consistent with the asymmetric estimation 
of influence hypothesis. Witnesses who received the cautionary instruction estimated 
significantly less of an effect of the instruction than did witnesses who did not receive the 
cautionary instruction. In other words, generating a counterfactual response in which 
witnesses added the influence of the cautionary instruction had a greater impact than 
generating a counterfactual response in which witnesses subtracted the influence of the 
cautionary instruction. A 48-hour time delay between providing an actual identification 
response and providing a counterfactual identification response had no significant effect on 
this pattern. 
Again, it had been predicted that an asymmetric estimation would lead witnesses who 
received the cautionary instruction to underestimate the impact that the cautionary instruction 
had on their lineup decision, and witnesses who did not receive the cautionary instruction to 
more accurately estimate the impact that the cautionary instruction would have had on their 
lineup decision. Results were consistent with this prediction. Comparisons of actual to 
counterfactual responses suggest that many witnesses who received the cautionary instruction 
and rejected the lineup failed to recognize that their rejection was a consequence of the 
cautionary instruction. In contrast, these comparisons also suggest that witnesses who did not 
receive the cautionary instruction and consequently made an identification correctly tended 
to recognize that they would have rejected the lineup had they instead received the cautionary 
instruction. Again, it appears that the ability of witnesses to accurately estimate the influence 
of the cautionary instruction is dependent on whether they received that instruction or not. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The legal system often implicitly assumes that witnesses can accurately report on the 
effects of influencing variables (the accurate report assumption). This general assumption is 
composed of four more specific assumptions: that witnesses consciously notice an 
influencing variable, that they remember that influencing variable at a later time, that they 
can determine whether that variable had an influence on them, and that they can accurately 
estimate the effects of the influence by assessing the influencing variable's direction and 
magnitude of influence. The purpose of the current experiments was primarily to assess the 
validity of these assumptions, and secondarily to determine whether the accuracy of 
witnesses' reports of influence was moderated by time delay. 
Results clearly indicate that witnesses in both experiments tended to consciously 
notice and remember the influencing variable. When asked to provide an account of what the 
experimenter had told them immediately after (Experiment 1) or before (Experiment 2) the 
lineup identification, the majority of witnesses (approximately 80 - 85% across both 
experiments) who had received the influencing variable correctly recalled having received it. 
The majority of witnesses (approximately 85 - 90% across both experiments) who had 
received the influencing variable also correctly recognized the specific feedback statement 
(Experiment 1) or instruction (Experiment 2) that was given to them from a list of five 
options. This cannot be attributed to any sort of response bias because almost all witnesses 
who did not receive the influencing variable correctly reported not having received any 
confirming feedback (Experiment 1) or cautionary instruction (Experiment 2). Thus, 
witnesses across both experiments, as a whole, tended to notice and remember the 
influencing variable that was presented to them. The fact that rates of recalling/recognizing 
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the influencing variable were not moderated by a 48-hour time delay in either experiment 
indicates that witnesses tended to remember having received the influencing variable 
regardless of delay condition. 
One interesting exception to the general finding that witnesses tended to remember 
the influencing variable was found in Experiment 1. Although most witnesses in this 
experiment correctly reported receiving post-identification feedback before answering 
questions about their confidence, view, and attention, over one third incorrectly reported that 
they received the feedback after answering those questions. This finding is especially 
intriguing in light of the fact that such a temporal order of events would have made it 
impossible for feedback to have influenced witnesses' responses, and yet these witnesses 
nonetheless estimated having been just as influenced by the feedback as witnesses who 
reported having received feedback before giving their responses. It should be noted that all 
witnesses were told the correct temporal order of events prior to generating their 
counterfactual responses, and this reminder may have led witnesses to assume that feedback 
could have influenced them. The current data do not allow an assessment of whether a 
similar finding would occur among witnesses who are not told the correct temporal order 
before generating counterfactual responses. But if this finding is replicable, it would be more 
than simply an intellectual curiosity, as misremembering when one was presented with an 
influencing variable has important real-world implications. A witness who incorrectly claims 
that she did not receive feedback until after giving a confidence statement might lead her 
defense attorney to forgo the possibility that the feedback influenced her confidence 
statement. This finding may therefore be important, and is certainly worthy of future 
investigation. 
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Results concerning witnesses' abilities to determine whether they were influenced, 
and to accurately estimate the effects of the influence, were somewhat more interesting. After 
giving their actual lineup responses (reports of retrospective confidence, view, and attention 
in Experiment 1; lineup identification decisions in Experiment 2), all witnesses in both 
experiments were asked to give a counterfactual lineup response. These counterfactual 
responses were witnesses' estimates of how they would have responded to the key questions 
had they been in the alternative experimental condition (confirming feedback vs. no feedback 
for Experiment 1; cautionary instruction vs. no cautionary instruction for Experiment 2). This 
technique allowed an analysis of whether witnesses could accurately estimate the effects of 
the influence by comparing the counterfactual responses of witnesses who received the 
influencing manipulation to the actual responses of witnesses who did not receive the 
influencing manipulation, and vice versa. 
Using this analysis, Experiment 1 demonstrated that witnesses were quite accurate 
when 'subtracting' the influence of confirming feedback, but were not accurate when 
'adding' the influence of confirming feedback. These latter witnesses tended to overestimate 
the influence confirming feedback would have had. Conversely, Experiment 2 demonstrated 
that witnesses were quite accurate when 'adding' the influence of a cautionary instruction, 
but were not accurate when 'subtracting' the influence of a cautionary instruction. These 
latter witnesses tended to underestimate the influence the cautionary instruction had. None of 
these results from either study were significantly moderated by a 48-hour time delay. Thus, 
for each experiment, some witnesses were able to accurately determine the magnitude of 
influence, whereas others were not. Additionally, the accurate witnesses in Experiment 1 
tended to be those who received the influencing variable (confirming feedback) and had to 
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subtract its influence whereas the accurate witnesses in Experiment 2 tended to be those who 
did not receive the influencing variable (the cautionary instruction) and had to add its 
influence. Can these apparently conflicting results be integrated into a larger theoretical 
framework? 
Despite the seemingly opposing findings of the two experiments, results from both 
experiments exhibited an asymmetric estimation of influence pattern, such that witnesses 
who received the influencing manipulation estimated significantly less of an effect of the 
influencing variable than witnesses who did not receive the influencing manipulation. This 
asymmetric estimation of influence pattern had been predicted a priori on the basis of two 
independent literatures, one concerning the hindsight bias and the other concerning 
counterfactual thinking. According to research on the hindsight bias, people have a difficult 
time 'erasing' information from their minds, as they tend to think that they would have 
known that information anyway. In the current experiments, one can think of witnesses who 
received the influencing manipulation as having also received additional information about 
the identification process (i.e., that they identified the correct person in Experiment 1; that 
the actual criminal may not be in the lineup in Experiment 2). When generating 
counterfactual responses about how they would have responded had they not received that 
information, these witnesses were likely to have thought that despite not having received that 
information explicitly from the lineup administrator, they would have known it anyway. 
Consequently, they would have reasoned that whether or not they had received that 
information, their responses would not have been very different. In contrast, witnesses who 
did not receive the influencing manipulation gave their actual responses without having had 
that extra information. When later asked how they would have responded had they been 
given that information, these witnesses could reason how that information would have 
influenced them, and consequently their counterfactual responses would differ from their 
actual responses. Thus, the asymmetric estimation of influence pattern may simply reflect the 
fact that the hindsight bias affected witnesses who received the influencing manipulation, but 
not witnesses who did not receive the influencing manipulation. 
According to research on counterfactual thinking, additive frames have a greater 
impact than subtractive frames. It is possible that witnesses who did not receive the 
influencing manipulation self-generated additive frames when generating their counterfactual 
responses (e.g., "How much more confident would I have been had I received confirming 
feedback?") whereas witnesses who did receive the influencing manipulation self-generated 
subtractive frames when generating their counterfactuals (e.g., "How much less confident 
would I have been had I not received confirming feedback?"), leading to the asymmetric 
pattern of data seen in Experiment 1. It is thought that additive versus subtractive frames lead 
to an asymmetry because people tend to give more weight to factors that produce an outcome 
than to factors that inhibit an outcome (Dunning & Parpal, 1989). Thus, witnesses who did 
not receive the influencing manipulation and who self-generated an additive frame when 
giving their counterfactual responses are likely to focus on factors that would have produced 
the outcome of high confidence (i.e., the confirming feedback). In contrast, witnesses who 
did receive the influencing manipulation and who self-generated a subtractive frame when 
giving their counterfactual responses are nonetheless still likely to focus on factors that 
would produce, rather than inhibit, the outcome of high confidence. For example, they might 
tend to focus on the sense of familiarity they experienced while looking at that lineup 
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member while ignoring the perceived discrepancies between their memory of the criminal 
and the identified lineup member's appearance. 
The explanations for the asymmetric estimation of influence pattern offered by the 
hindsight bias and the counterfactual research on framing are similar, though not identical. 
Both postulate that counterfactual responses generated by witnesses who received the 
influencing manipulation should show less of a change (compared to actual responses) than 
those generated by witnesses who did not receive the influencing manipulation. However, the 
hindsight bias approach explains the asymmetry by claiming that witnesses who received the 
influencing manipulation cannot completely 'erase' the influencing information from their 
minds when generating counterfactuals. The counterfactual approach, in contrast, explains 
the asymmetry by claiming that witnesses who received the influencing manipulation cannot 
'erase' their high confidence from their minds when generating counterfactuals, which leads 
to a biased weighting of factors that might produce high confidence. The difference between 
the two approaches therefore largely comes down to whether it is knowledge of the 
antecedent condition (i.e., the influencing information) or knowledge of the outcome (i.e., the 
high confidence) that biases witnesses who receive an influencing manipulation. Future 
research is needed to disentangle these two explanations for the asymmetry. For example, 
imagine that witnesses were given disconfirming feedback instead of confirming feedback. 
The hindsight bias approach would predict that because disconfirming feedback gives 
witnesses information that they did not identify the actual criminal, those given 
disconfirming feedback should estimate less of an influence of feedback than those given no 
feedback. However, the counterfactual approach would predict the opposite. Because 
witnesses given disconfirming feedback should self-generate an additive frame when 
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generating their counterfactual response (i.e., "How much more confident would I have been 
had I not received disconfirming feedback?"), they should estimate more of an influence of 
feedback than witnesses not given feedback, who should self-generate a subtractive frame 
(i.e., "How much less confident would I have been had I received disconfirming feedback?"). 
Although the exact source of the asymmetry awaits future research, note that both 
explanations place the cause of the asymmetry at the feet of the witnesses who received the 
influencing manipulation. Both explanations stress that it is the misperceptions of these 
witnesses, not witnesses who did not receive the influencing manipulation, that drive the 
asymmetric pattern. Unfortunately, in the real world, it is typically witnesses who received an 
influencing variable who are asked to estimate the effects of the influencing variable. The 
aforementioned hypotheses for the asymmetry pattern suggest that it is precisely these 
witnesses who are most biased when generating counterfactuals. 
Interestingly, however, the asymmetric estimations of influence led to different 
results for Experiments 1 and 2. In Experiment 1, the asymmetry was a result of witnesses 
who received the influencing manipulation accurately estimating the effects of feedback and 
witnesses who did not receive the influencing manipulation overestimating the effects of 
feedback. In Experiment 2, the asymmetry was a result of witnesses who received the 
influencing manipulation underestimating the effects of the cautionary instruction and 
witnesses who did not receive the influencing manipulation accurately estimating the effects 
of the cautionary instruction. Thus, although the overall asymmetric pattern of data was 
remarkably consistent between experiments, the specifics of the pattern differed. Perhaps 
there are certain qualities of the specific influencing variable under study that affect the 
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absolute degree to which witnesses can accurately estimate the effects of influence, but the 
estimation nonetheless tends to occur asymmetrically. 
But what qualities of the influencing variable would affect the absolute degree of 
estimation? Although lacking relevant data that speak to this question, speculation is 
possible. It is almost certainly true that witnesses have different implicit theories of the 
effects of different influencing manipulations. Differences in these theories may originate 
from how easily they can imagine the specific variable having an effect, the salience of the 
variable, the perceived malleability of the response, etc. Witnesses may, for example, readily 
assume that post-identification feedback would affect their retrospective confidence reports 
because they perceive retrospective confidence to be malleable. They may not think that 
feedback could affect their reports of view and attention, however, because they perceive 
these variables to be more objective and hence less malleable. Similarly, witnesses may be 
more skeptical of the influence that pre-lineup instructions can have on the likelihood of 
making a lineup identification because they assume identifications to be purely a function of 
perceived familiarity. Depending on how accurate these implicit theories about influence are 
compared to the actual influence exerted by such manipulations, different patterns of data 
will result. Given that an asymmetry exists, if witnesses tend to have implicit theories that 
overestimate the strength of a manipulation, then one would expect to see data as found on 
the confidence measure in Experiment 1: Witnesses who do not receive an influencing 
manipulation should overestimate the influence whereas witnesses who do receive an 
influencing manipulation should more accurately estimate the influence. If witnesses tend to 
have accurate implicit theories about the impact of a manipulation, then one would expect to 
see data as found in Experiment 2: Witnesses who do not receive an influencing 
55 
manipulation should accurately estimate the influence whereas witnesses who do receive an 
influencing manipulation should underestimate the influence. If witnesses tend to have 
implicit theories that underestimate the strength of a manipulation, then one would expect a 
third pattern: Witnesses who receive an influencing manipulation as well as witnesses who 
do not receive an influencing manipulation should both underestimate the influence, but 
those who received the influencing manipulation will underestimate the influence more. 
Thus, differences in witnesses' implicit theories about a manipulation may affect the absolute 
degree of estimation that they exhibit. This coupled with a general asymmetric estimation of 
influence pattern would lead to different patterns of results, depending on the specific 
influencing variable in question. Future research would be needed to test this hypothesis. 
Strengths and Limitations. 
No previously-used paradigm could adequately answer the question of whether 
witnesses can accurately estimate the effects of influence, and the question had, until now, 
gone largely unasked. The current experiments introduce a novel experimental paradigm to 
the eyewitness literature that allows us to examine this question. The paradigm is a powerful 
one for a number of reasons. First, it assesses not simply whether witnesses believe they were 
influenced or not (e.g., Wells et al., 2003), but also the magnitude of the perceived influence. 
This is important because although witnesses may accurately claim to have been influenced 
by a given variable, they might not accurately assess the magnitude of that influence, a point 
obscured by previous attempts to address this issue. Second, assessing both the actual as well 
as the counterfactual responses of witnesses allows a direct comparison between the 
counterfactual responses of witnesses who received the influencing manipulation and the 
actual responses of witnesses who did not receive the influencing manipulation, and vice 
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versa, to assess whether witnesses' tend to overestimate, underestimate, or accurately 
estimate the effects of influence. Third, the paradigm is modeled after certain real-world 
practices in which witnesses are asked how they would have responded had they received or 
not received some potentially influencing manipulation, thus maintaining a high degree of 
external validity. 
Nonetheless, there are a number of limitations of the current research. Estimation of 
influence was assessed at the group level, not the individual witness level. Any conclusions 
that are drawn therefore do not necessarily reflect individual witnesses. For example, 
witnesses in Experiment 2 who received the cautionary instruction tended, as a group, to 
underestimate its influence. This simply means that fewer witnesses switched from a "not 
there" response (in their actual report) to a lineup identification response (in their 
counterfactual report) than was expected. But of course many witnesses did switch responses. 
Thus, although as a group witnesses underestimated the influence of the cautionary 
instruction, some individual witnesses might have accurately estimated its influence and 
others might not have. Additionally, although the 'correct' response for most of those 
witnesses was to switch to a lineup identification (i.e., they actually would have made an 
identification had they not received the cautionary instruction), the 'correct' response for 
some was to maintain a 'not there' response (i.e., they actually would have still made a 'not 
there' response, even without the cautionary instruction). There is no way to tell which of the 
individual witnesses would have made a 'not there' response had they not received the 
cautionary instruction, only that a certain proportion of them would have. Similar ambiguities 
arise from Experiment 1 ; although we know that on average confirming feedback boosted 
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witnesses' retrospective confidence about 9%, this does not tell us how any individual 
witness was influenced. 
This restriction on the interpretation of these data may be an unfortunate but 
necessary limit imposed by the type of question asked in these experiments, a lament also 
noted by other researchers of people's abilities to estimate influence (Wilson et al., 2002). It 
seems difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of a paradigm in which one could measure 
individual witnesses' accuracy. That would require a knowledge of what the witness would 
actually have done in the alternative experimental condition, which would require each 
witness to be run through the experiment twice - one time receiving the influencing variable 
and the other time not receiving the influencing variable. That is the only way to compare an 
individual witness's counterfactual response to his or her own actual response in the 
alternative experimental condition. Unfortunately, the problems inherent with this type of 
within-subjects design would render the interpretation of any such data meaningless. Thus, 
the between-subjects, group-level assessment of data may be a necessary component of this 
type of research. 
Caution should also be taken when generalizing from these experiments. Although 
the asymmetric estimation of influence pattern was observed in the predicted direction across 
both experiments, and although it has a solid theoretical grounding in both the hindsight bias 
and the counterfactual literature, it would be premature to conclusively state that a similar 
asymmetric pattern would exist across most other potential manipulations. Perhaps, for 
example, it is not the presence or absence of the influencing variable that causes the 
asymmetry, but some other underlying factor that coincidentally co-varied with the 
presence/absence factor. Although no such underlying factor is immediately apparent, 
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replication with other manipulations is nonetheless required to validate that the presence or 
absence of the influencing variable is truly the cause of the asymmetry. 
This research also involved a somewhat limited operationalization of time delay. 
Although time delay was found to have no significant moderating effects on any variable for 
either of the two studies, this lack of result may simply have occurred because the time delay 
used - 48 hours - was not long enough to produce any deleterious effects on witnesses' 
memories for the influencing variable. Perhaps a time delay of a week, a month, or longer 
could interact with witnesses' estimates of influence, but given the limitations of laboratory 
experiments, these delay manipulations would be increasingly more difficult to test. 
Unfortunately, in real-world cases, delays of months or even years between a lineup 
identification and a trial are not uncommon. In a recent DNA exoneration case, a witness was 
asked in court about lineup procedures that occurred fifteen years prior (Newsome v. 
McCabe, 2002). 
It is also unknown, on the basis of the two experiments described here, whether any 
estimates of influence made by witnesses were the result of introspective awareness of the 
influence or implicit theories about the effects of influence. Could those witnesses who 
accurately estimated the effects of influence actually retrace their cognitive processes and 
accurately 'undo' or 'add' the effects of influence? Or did they simply have an implicit 
theory about how they think they would have been affected, and happened to be accurate? 
Although these are difficult questions to definitively answer, data suggest that witnesses were 
responding on the basis of implicit theories rather than introspection, for a number of 
reasons. For instance, 27% of witnesses who received confirming feedback in Experiment 1 
gave the same counterfactual response as actual response on the confidence measure, 
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meaning that they felt that they were not influenced by the confirming feedback. Wells et al. 
(2003), however, found that 65% of witnesses who received confirming feedback in their 
study reported that they were not affected by the feedback. This large discrepancy is most 
easily explained in one of two ways. 
First, witnesses in the current experiment were reminded of when they received 
feedback (i.e., that it was prior to generating their counterfactual responses), whereas 
witnesses in the Wells et al. (2003) study were not reminded of when they received 
confirming feedback. If some witnesses in the latter study erroneously thought they received 
feedback after giving their confidence reports (as did 34% in the current study) and they 
were never disabused of this notion, then they may have reasoned that feedback could 
logically not have influenced them. In contrast, witnesses in the current experiment were 
disabused of this notion, and thus should have been more likely to indicate that they could 
have been influenced by the feedback. Note that this explanation for the discrepancy between 
the two studies almost necessitates the use of implicit theories; witnesses who would have 
said that they were not influenced (because they mistakenly thought feedback followed their 
responses) reported having been influenced when they were disabused. How could they 
suddenly now report the effects of influence other than with an implicit theory? 
Second, the discrepancy between the two studies may be explained by the way the 
question concerning influence was asked in each study. Witnesses in the Wells et al. (2003) 
study were asked whether their response to the confidence question had been influenced by 
the feedback, and they simply responded yes or no. In contrast, witnesses in Experiment 1 of 
the present study were asked how they would have responded to the confidence question had 
they not received feedback, and were given the confidence scale to indicate their response. 
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Although technically the same question, the phrasing of the question in the current study may 
have implied to the witnesses that their counterfactual response should be different from their 
actual response, leading to a lower rate of 'no change' responses. If this is indeed the case, 
then it indicates that witnesses' responses were affected by factors external to their own 
cognitive processes (e.g., wording of the question, beliefs about what the correct response is), 
suggesting a lack of introspective awareness. In particular, the phrasing of the question used 
in Experiment 1 may have lead witnesses to think about implicit theories about how 
confirming feedback would have influenced them, and these implicit theories may have 
driven their responses. 
It is also difficult to reconcile the fact that witnesses overestimated and 
underestimated the effects of influence with the idea that they used introspective awareness 
to generate their counterfactual responses. If witnesses truly had direct introspective access, 
how could they possibly think that confirming feedback would have had a stronger impact 
than it in fact would have? How could they think that receiving the cautionary instruction did 
not influence them when it in fact did? In contrast, both of these findings are perfectly 
consistent with an implicit theories perspective - overestimation and underestimation of 
influence occur when witnesses' implicit theories overestimate and underestimate, 
respectively, the actual influence of a variable. If it is true, as argued previously, that 
differences in the absolute degree of estimation observed across influencing variables are the 
result of differences in implicit theories about those influencing variables, little room is left 
for introspection. 
Even if introspection could somehow account for systematic over- or underestimation 
of influence, there is still no theoretical reason why this would vary as a function of response 
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or influencing manipulation. But witnesses who did not receive feedback tended to 
overestimate the effect that feedback would have had on their confidence whereas they more 
accurately estimated the effect that feedback would have had on their reports of view and 
attention. If witnesses were introspecting, what mechanism would have led them to 
overestimate the effect of feedback when making one response but accurately estimate the 
effect of feedback on two other responses? Once again, the implicit theories perspective 
offers an easy explanation. If witnesses have implicit theories that self-reported retrospective 
confidence is highly malleable, but self-reported view of the criminal and attention paid to 
the criminal are not, then their estimates of the influence of feedback on their reports of 
confidence should be greater than their estimates of the influence of feedback on their reports 
of view and attention. In fact, consistent with the idea that confidence responses are 
perceived as being more malleable than view and attention responses, previous research has 
found that witnesses more readily admit that confirming feedback could have influenced their 
responses to retrospective confidence questions rather than their responses to view and 
attention questions (Wells & Bradfield, 1998). Thus, whereas an introspective account of 
witnesses' abilities would require ad hoc additions to the theory in order to explain the 
aforementioned anomalies, an implicit theories perspective offers a parsimonious and 
powerful approach to understanding witnesses' estimates of influence. Until more research 
uncovers witnesses' implicit theories, however, this perspective necessarily remains 
speculative. 
Future research 
In a practical sense, it does not matter much in the real world how witnesses arrive at 
their final counterfactual responses, be it introspection or implicit theories, as long as those 
responses are accurate. Knowledge about the introspective capabilities of witnesses does 
matter though when trying to determine how to improve witnesses' performance when they 
are not accurate. If witnesses' responses are guided by implicit theories, and not introspective 
awareness, then an understanding of how witnesses generate implicit theories, and the impact 
those implicit theories have on witnesses' subsequent responses, is of paramount importance. 
Future research might wish to more fully examine the implicit theories witnesses have about 
various lineup manipulations. 
The willingness of witnesses to give different counterfactual responses than actual 
responses suggests that regardless of whether through introspection or implicit theories, 
witnesses are willing to report that they were (or could be) influenced. But if witnesses were 
aware of the influence of confirming feedback or of the cautionary instruction, why would 
witnesses have let these variables influence them in the first place? Why would they not 
correct for them at the time they gave their actual responses? Perhaps witnesses are not aware 
of the influence of variables at the time they are experiencing them, but only become aware 
retrospectively at a later time when they are asked about them. Perhaps when witnesses are 
receiving the influencing variable, they lack an alternative version of events, and it is only 
when such an alternative is presented to them that they can contrast the two to determine 
influence. This would suggest that witnesses' abilities to accurately correct for influence 
depend on the salience of a counterfactual occurrence. For example, maybe witnesses who 
are given a biased lineup instruction suggesting that the criminal is present in the lineup 
could 'undo' the influence of that instruction in real time, as opposed to retrospectively, if 
they were also aware of the possibility that they could instead have received a cautionary 
instruction. This possibility is partially supported by research that found that people's 
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theories about the causal relationships between variables are influenced by the relative 
availability and salience of various causal explanations (Anderson & Sechler, 1986). Thus, if 
witnesses are aware that they could have received a cautionary instruction, for example, the 
salience of that knowledge alone should affect their implicit theories about the effects of pre-
lineup instructions. Not only could these implicit theories then moderate the effects of pre-
lineup instructions, but they might also affect witnesses' estimates of influence. Anderson 
and Sechler found that simply generating possible reasons why two variables might be 
related increased people's belief in that relationship. Similarly, they also found that 
subsequently generating possible reasons why the two variables might not be related 
eliminated that effect. Thus, an awareness of an alternative pre-lineup instruction might lead 
witnesses to generate causal explanations about the effects of that variable, which could 
affect witnesses' implicit theories and subsequently their estimates of influence. Such limits 
and moderating factors of witnesses' abilities to accurately estimate the effects of influence 
should be another area at which future research is aimed. 
The previous discussion suggests that in cases where witnesses who received some 
influencing variable tend to underestimate the influence of that variable (as in Experiment 2), 
it may be beneficial to first allow witnesses to generate causal explanations about how that 
influencing variable might generally affect lineup responses. If this increases the salience of 
that causal relationship, this should lead witnesses to estimate a greater effect of the 
influencing variable on their own responses, and hence to be more accurate when generating 
their counterfactual responses. This idea is consistent with the concept of belief perseverance, 
which describes the tendency of people to maintain their pre-existing beliefs about the 
relationship between two variables even when data supporting that belief are completely 
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discredited (Anderson & Kellam, 1992; Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975). The asymmetric 
estimation of influence pattern observed in the current experiments may reflect a type of 
belief perseverance. Witnesses who received an influencing manipulation are given 
information, which they are supposed to in effect "discredit" when giving their 
counterfactual responses. The asymmetric estimation of influence pattern may reflect the 
inability of witnesses who received an influencing manipulation to properly "discredit" the 
information that was given to them. However, belief perseverance has been shown to be 
reduced when people are forced to generate counterexplanations that conflict with their pre­
existing beliefs (Anderson, 1982). Thus, having witnesses generate possible explanations for 
how a lineup manipulation might influence people should have the effect of reducing belief 
perseverance, which could eliminate the asymmetric estimation of influence pattern. 
However, this tactic should not be used indiscriminately: If witnesses who receive some 
influencing variable tend to accurately estimate the influence of that variable (as in 
Experiment 1), this procedure might lead them to overestimate the effect of the variable. 
Again, a more complete understanding of witnesses' implicit theories about various lineup 
manipulations would be needed to accurately predict when this procedure might be 
beneficial. 
The conclusion from these experiments is clear, albeit tentative: Witnesses tend to 
asymmetrically estimate the effects of influencing variables. This asymmetric pattern should 
give one pause in assuming witnesses can accurately report on the effects of influencing 
variables. Previous discussion suggests that witnesses' abilities to accurately estimate the 
effects of influence depend on 1) whether they received the influencing manipulation or not 
(which drives the asymmetric pattern); and somewhat more speculatively, 2) whether 
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witnesses hold accurate or inaccurate implicit theories about the strength of the influencing 
manipulation (which might drive the absolute degree of estimation). Very little is currently 
known about witnesses' implicit theories about the effects of various lineup manipulations. 
Although some studies touching on this issue have demonstrated that peoples' implicit 
theories about the effect of influencing lineup manipulations are often inaccurate (e.g., 
Kassin & Bamdollar, 1992; Hasel, 2006), the question concerning what specific theories 
these people actually hold has been largely neglected. Without knowing witnesses' implicit 
theories, it is impossible to predict whether witnesses will tend to overestimate, 
underestimate, or accurately estimate the effects of the influence of a given manipulation. We 
can only predict that the correction will occur asymmetrically such that witnesses who 
receive an influencing manipulation will estimate less of an effect than will witnesses who do 
not receive an influencing manipulation. Research into witnesses' implicit theories is 
therefore strongly encouraged. However, despite our lack of understanding of the 
relationship between witnesses' implicit theories and their estimates of influence, the 
inconsistent estimates of influence seen in the current two experiments lead to one 
unequivocal recommendation: The best way to avoid influenced responses among 
eyewitnesses is to avoid influencing them in the first place. 
The current experiments introduced a novel paradigm to the eyewitness field in which 
witnesses' counterfactual responses as well as their actual responses are assessed. The 
strength of this paradigm lies in its ability to quantitatively assess the degree to which 
witnesses can estimate the effects of influence, an ability that is impossible with the 
previously-used paradigm. The data from the current experiments emphasize the promise of 
the actual/counterfactual paradigm by underscoring its sensitivity to finding different patterns 
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in the data. Across two experiments, underestimation, overestimation, and accurate 
estimation patterns were all shown; these estimation patterns were shown to occur 
asymmetrically as a function of whether witnesses received an influencing variable or not 
across two different influencing manipulations; and even within a single experiment 
(Experiment 1), estimation patterns were shown to vary as a function of outcome measure 
(confidence vs. view and attention). Although these findings in and of themselves do not 
prove the usefulness of the paradigm, they do suggest that it is sensitive enough to allow a 
multitude of data patterns to present themselves. In addition, the fact that some witnesses 
overcorrected in Experiment 1 suggests that concerns broached earlier about the previously-
used paradigm - namely, that witnesses may refuse to admit that they were influenced due to 
psychological reactance or out of a desire to dismiss the idea that external factors may have 
influenced them - may not apply to the actual/counterfactual paradigm. It is hoped that this 
paradigm will allow further research into the question of whether witnesses can accurately 
report on the effect of influencing variables, for although the present experiments provide a 
promising experimental paradigm as well as preliminary data upon which to build subsequent 
hypotheses, they only begin to scratch the surface of a question to which an answer is not yet 
fully known. 
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FIGURES 
Panel A: 
Accurate estimation of influence 
Panel B: 
No estimation of influence 
Witness 
response 
Witness 
response 
Actual Counterfactual 
Response 
Actual Counterfactual 
Response 
Panel C: 
Underestimation of influence 
Panel D: 
Asymmetric estimation of influence 
Witness 
response 
Witness 
response 
Actual Counterfactual Actual Counterfactual 
Response Response 
Figure 1. Possible patterns between witnesses' responses (actual vs. counterfactual) and 
experimental manipulation. Dotted and solid lines represent witnesses who received and 
did not receive the influencing variable, respectively. 'Witness response' is retrospective 
confidence for Study 1 and probability of a 'not there' response for Study 2. 
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Figure 2. Actual and Counterfactual responses to confirming feedback. Dotted lines 
represent witnesses who received confirming feedback; solid lines represent witnesses who 
did not receive confirming feedback. 
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Figure 3. Proportion of actual and counterfactual lineup rejections. The dotted 
line represents witnesses who received the cautionary instruction; the solid line 
represents witnesses who did not receive the cautionary instruction. 
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TABLES 
Table 1 
Pearson correlation coejficients between confidence, view, and attention on actual and 
counterfactual responses 
Measure Confidence View Attention 
Confidence 
View 
Attention 
Actual responses 
.38** .28** 
.25* 
Confidence 
View 
Attention 
Counterfactual responses 
- .54** .36** 
.42** 
* p < .05 ** p < .001 
Table 2 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of confidence, view, attention, and composite scores as functions of feedback, 
delay, and response 
Delay No delay Overall 
Measure Actual Remembered Counterfactual Actual Remembered Counterfactual Actual Remembered Counterfactual 
Confirming feedback 
Confidence 6.2 (2.8) 6.1 (2.7) 5.1 (2.6) 5.7 (2.5) 5.6 (2.5) 4.3 (2.3) 5.9 (2.6) 5.8 (2.6) 4.7 (2.5) 
View 7.3 (2.1) 7.4 (2.3) 6.6 (2.1) 6.7 (2.4) 6.6 (2.4) 5.6 (2.7) 7.0 (2.2) 6.9 (2.4) 6.2 (2.4) 
Attention 7.1 (2.0) 6.8 (2.1) 6.2 (2.4) 6.8 (2.1) 6.8 (2.2) 6.0 (2.5) 6.9 (2.1) 6.8 (2.1) 6.1 (2.5) 
Composite 6.9 (1.7) — 6.0(1.9) 6.4 (1.7) — 5.4(1.9) (5.6(1.7) — 5.7 (1.9) 
No feedback 
Confidence 5.2 (2.6) 5.2 (2.5) 7.5 (2.1) 4.9 (2.5) 4.9 (2.4) 7.7 (1.9) 5.0 (2.5) 5.0 (2.4) 7.7 (2.0) 
View 6.3 (1.8) 6.3 (2.3) 7.7 (1.6) 6.1 (2.0) 6.0 (2.0) 7.5 (1.9) (5.2(1.9) 6.2 (2.1) 7.6(1.8) 
Attention 6.3 (2.1) 6.3 (1.8) 7.3 (1.8) 5.9 (2.5) 5.9 (2.4) 7.4 (2.2) 6.1 (2.3) 6.1 (2.1) 7.4 (2.0) 
Composite 5.9 (1.5) 7.5(1.3) 5.6 (1.7) — 7.5 (1.6) 7.5 (1.4) — 7.5(1.4) 
Note. Confidence scores were converted to a 0 - 10 scale to match the other measures. Higher scores indicate greater confidence, a better view, 
and more attention paid to the criminal's face. Overall actual and counterfactual responses are also plotted in Figure 2. 
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Table 3 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of witnesses' estimates of the magnitude of 
the feedback effect as a function of feedback condition and measure 
Measure Confirming feedback No feedback 
Confidence 1.23(1.10) 2.64 (2.11) 
View .77 (1.04) 1.44 (1.38) 
Attention .81 (1.07) 1.27 (1.34) 
Composite .94 084) 1.78(1.16) 
Note. Confidence scores were converted to a 0 - 10 scale to match the other measures. 
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Table 4 
Percentage of witnesses who acknowledged an effect of feedback as a function of feedback 
condition and measure 
Measure Confirming feedback No feedback 
Confidence 73 88 
View 44 75 
Attention 50 73 
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Table 5 
Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of witnesses' estimates of the magnitude of 
the feedback effect, as a function of feedback condition and measure, among witnesses who 
acknowledged an effect of feedback 
Measure 
Confidence 
View 
Attention 
Confirming feedback 
1.68 093) 
1.74 086) 
1.62 098) 
No feedback 
2.99 (2.00) 
1.93 (1.26) 
1.76 (1.28) 
Note. Confidence scores were converted to a 0 - 10 scale to match the other measures. 
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Table 6 
Mean proportion of correct lineup rejections as a function of instruction condition, delay, 
and response 
Delay No delay Overall 
Instruction Actual Counterfactual Actual Counterfactual Actual Counterfactual 
Cautionary .52 .30 .44 .14 .48 .21 
No cautionary .04 .50 .09 .56 .07 .53 
Note. Overall actual and counterfactual proportions are also plotted in Figure 2. 
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APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENT 1 ACTUAL RESPONSE MEASURES 
1) At the time you identified the person in the lineup, how certain were you that the person 
you identified from the lineup was the person you saw in the video? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all Totally 
certain certain 
2) How good of a view did you get of the person in the video? 
0 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
Very poor Very good 
3) How much attention were you paying to the person's face while viewing the video? 
0 1  2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9  1 0  
None My total 
attention 
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APPENDIX B: EXPERIMENT 1 MEMORY MEASURES 
Witnesses who received confirming feedback 
* Immediately following your identification, what comments, if any, did the lineup 
administrator make to you regarding your identification? 
Which of the following statements did the lineup administrator make to you following your 
lineup identification? 
a) "Good. Other witnesses also identified him." 
b) "Actually, you did not identify the suspect." 
c) "Good. You identified the suspect." 
d) "You actually identified the wrong lineup member." 
e) The lineup administrator made no comment about your lineup identification. 
The experimenter actually told you "Good. You identified the suspect" after your 
identification. 
Did the lineup administrator make this statement before or after you answered the question 
about your certainty in your identification? (circle one) 
Before After 
*Note that each individual question was asked sequentially 
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APPENDIX B (continued) 
The lineup administrator actually made that comment before you answered the question 
about your certainty in your identification. 
After you made you identification, you responded to three questions. We are interested in 
whether you can remember your responses to those questions. 
1) When you originally answered the following question about your certainty (after your 
identification), how did you respond? 
At the time you identified the person in the lineup, how certain were you that the person you 
identified from the lineup was the person you saw in the video? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all Totally 
certain certain 
2) When you originally answered the following question about your view of the criminal, 
how did you respond? 
2) How good of a view did you get of the person in the video? 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6 7 8 9  1 0  
Very poor Very good 
3) When you originally answered the following question about the amount of attention you 
paid to the criminal, how did you respond? 
3) How much attention were you paying to the person's face while viewing the video? 
0 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
None My total 
attention 
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APPENDIX B (continued) 
Witnesses who did not receive confirming feedback 
Immediately following your identification, what comments, if any, did the lineup 
administrator make to you regarding your identification? 
Which of the following statements did the lineup administrator make to you following your 
lineup identification? 
a) "Good. Other witnesses also identified him." 
b) "Actually, you did not identify the suspect." 
c) "Good. You identified the suspect." 
d) "You actually identified the wrong lineup member." 
e) The lineup administrator made no comment about your lineup identification. 
*Note that each individual question was asked sequentially 
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APPENDIX B (continued) 
The lineup administrator actually made no comment about your identification. 
After you made your identification, you responded to three questions. We are interested in 
whether you can remember your responses to those questions. 
1) When you originally answered the following question about your certainty (after your 
identification), how did you respond? 
At the time you identified the person in the lineup, how certain were you that the person you 
identified from the lineup was the person you saw in the video? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all Totally 
certain certain 
2) When you originally answered the following question about your view of the criminal, 
how did you respond? 
How good of a view did you get of the person in the video? 
0  1  2 3 4  5  6 7 8 9  1 0  
Very poor Very good 
3) When you originally answered the following question about the amount of attention you 
paid to the criminal, how did you respond? 
How much attention were you paying to the person's face while viewing the video? 
0  1  2 3 4  5  6 7 8 9  1 0  
None My total 
attention 
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APPENDIX C: EXPERIMENT 1 COUNTERFACTUAL RESPONSE MEASURES 
Witnesses who received confirming feedback 
For the following questions, imagine that instead of saying "Good. You identified the 
suspect," the experimenter had not told you anything after you had made your identification. 
1) If the experimenter had not told you anything after you had made your identification, how 
would you have answered the following question about your certainty? 
At the time you identified the person in the lineup, how certain were you that the person you 
identified from the lineup was the person you saw in the video? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all Totally 
certain certain 
2) If the experimenter had not told you anything after you had made your identification, how 
would you have answered the following question about your view of the criminal? 
How good of a view did you get of the person in the video? 
0  1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
Very poor Very good 
3) If the experimenter had not told you anything after you had made your identification, how 
would you have answered the following question about how much attention you paid to the 
criminal? 
How much attention were you paying to the person's face while viewing the video? 
0  1  2  3 4 5 6 7 8 9  1 0  
None My total 
attention 
*Note that all witnesses were shown the original lineup as well as their actual responses when answering these 
questions 
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APPENDIX C (continued) 
Witnesses who did not receive confirming feedback 
For the following questions, imagine that instead of making no comment about your 
identification, the experimenter had told you "Good. You identified the suspect" immediately 
after making your identification. 
1) If the experimenter had made this statement after you had made your identification, how 
would you have answered the following question about your certainty? 
At the time you identified the person in the lineup, how certain were you that the person you 
identified from the lineup was the person you saw in the video? 
2) If the experimenter had made this statement after you had made your identification, how 
would you have answered the following question about your view of the criminal? 
How good of a view did you get of the person in the video? 
3) If the experimenter had made this statement after you had made your identification, how 
would you have answered the following question about how much attention you paid to the 
criminal? 
How much attention were you paying to the person's face while viewing the video? 
0 10 
Not at all 
certain 
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Totally 
certain 
0 1 
Very poor 
2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9  1 0  
Very good 
0 1 
None 
2 3  4  5  6  7 8 9  1 0  
My total 
attention 
*Note that all witnesses were shown the original lineup as well as their actual responses when answering these 
questions 
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APPENDIX D: EXPERIMENT 2 MEMORY MEASURES 
Witnesses who received the cautionary instruction 
How certain are you in your identification decision? 
0 10 
Not at all 
certain 
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Totally 
certain 
Immediately before you were shown a lineup, the lineup administrator said "I have here a 
copy of a photo lineup. " What instructions, if any, did the lineup administrator give you after 
this statement? 
After the lineup administrator said "I have here a copy of a photo lineup, " which of the 
following instructions did the lineup administrator then give to you? 
a) "Keep in mind that your job is to identify the criminal. Please make an 
identification now." 
b) "Keep in mind that it is as important to free the innocent as it is to identify the 
guilty. Please be cautious when making your identification." 
c) "Keep in mind that the actual criminal may or may not be in the lineup. Look at 
the people in the photo lineup and tell me if you see the criminal." 
d) "Keep in mind while you are making your identification that the criminal may 
have changed appearance." 
e) "Look at the people in the photo lineup and try to identify the criminal you saw 
in the video." 
f) None of the above 
*Note that each individual question was asked sequentially 
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APPENDIX D (continued) 
The lineup administrator actually instructed you to "keep in mind that the actual criminal 
may or may not be in the lineup. Look at the people in the photo lineup and tell me if you see 
the criminal" before showing you the lineup. We are now interested in whether you can 
remember the responses you made to the lineup. 
1) Which lineup member did you identify immediately after seeing the mock crime? (Circle 
your response) 
1 ) 1  
2)2 
3 ) 3  
4 ) 4  
5 ) 5  
6) 6 
7) I did not identify any of the lineup members 
2) After you made your identification, you responded to a question about your certainty. We 
are interested in whether you can remember your response to this question. 
When vou originally answered the following question about your certainty (after your 
identification), how did you respond? 
How certain are you in your identification decision? 
0 10 
Not at all 
certain 
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Totally 
certain 
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APPENDIX D (continued) 
Witnesses who did not receive the cautionary instruction 
How certain are you in your identification decision? 
0 10 
Not at all 
certain 
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Totally 
certain 
Immediately before you were shown a lineup, the lineup administrator said "I have here a 
copy of a photo lineup. " What instructions, if any, did the lineup administrator give you after 
this statement? 
After the lineup administrator said "I have here a copy of a photo lineup, " which of the 
following instructions did the lineup administrator then give to you? 
a) "Keep in mind that your job is to identify the criminal. Please make an 
identification now." 
b) "Keep in mind that it is as important to free the innocent as it is to identify the 
guilty. Please be cautious when making your identification." 
c) "Keep in mind that the actual criminal may or may not be in the lineup. Look at 
the people in the photo lineup and tell me if you see the criminal." 
d) "Keep in mind while you are making your identification that the criminal may 
have changed appearance." 
e) "Look at the people in the photo lineup and try to identify the criminal you saw 
in the video." 
f) None of the above 
*Note that each individual question was asked sequentially 
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APPENDIX D (continued) 
The lineup administrator actually instructed you to "look at the people in the photo lineup 
and try to identify the criminal you saw in the video" before showing you the lineup. We are 
now interested in whether you can remember the responses you made to the lineup. 
Please look at the lineup that you were shown. 
1) Which lineup member did you identify immediately after seeing the mock crime? (Circle 
your response) 
1 ) 1  
2 ) 2  
3 ) 3  
4 ) 4  
5 ) 5  
6) 6 
7) I did not identify any of the lineup members 
2) After you made your identification, you responded to a question about your certainty. We 
are interested in whether you can remember your response to this question. 
When you originally answered the following question about your certainty (after your 
identification), how did you respond? 
How certain are you in your identification decision? 
0 10 
Not at all 
certain 
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Totally 
certain 
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APPENDIX E: EXPERIMENT 2 COUNTERFACTUAL RESPONSE MEASURES 
For the following questions, imagine that instead of telling you to "keep in mind that the 
criminal may or may not be in the lineup. Look at the people in the photo lineup and tell me 
if you see the criminal" the experimenter had told you to "look at the people in the photo 
lineup and try to identify the criminal who you saw in the video. " 
1) If the experimenter had given you this alternate instruction, how would you have 
responded to the lineup? 
1) I would have identified lineup member #1 
2) I would have identified lineup member #2 
3) I would have identified lineup member #3 
4) I would have identified lineup member #4 
5) I would have identified lineup member #5 
6) I would have identified lineup member #6 
7) I would not have identified any of the lineup members. 
2) If the experimenter had given you this alternate instruction, how would you have 
responded to the following question about your certainty? 
How certain are you in your identification decision? 
Witnesses who received the cautionary instruction 
0 10 
Not at all 
certain 
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Totally 
certain 
*Note that all witnesses were shown the original lineup as well as their actual responses when answering these 
questions 
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APPENDIX E (continued) 
Witnesses who did not receive the cautionary instruction 
For the following questions, imagine that instead of telling you to "look at the people in the 
photo lineup and try to identify the criminal who you saw in the video, " the experimenter had 
told you to "keep in mind that the criminal may or may not be in the lineup. Look at the 
people in the photo lineup and tell me if you see the criminal. " 
1) If the experimenter had given you this alternate instruction, how would you have 
responded to the lineup? 
1 ) 1  w o u l d  h a v e  i d e n t i f i e d  l i n e u p  m e m b e r  # 1  
2) I would have identified lineup member #2 
3) I would have identified lineup member #3 
4) I would have identified lineup member #4 
5) I would have identified lineup member #5 
6) I would have identified lineup member #6 
7) I would not have identified any of the lineup members. 
2) If the experimenter had given you this alternate instruction, how would you have 
responded to the following question about your certainty? 
How certain are you in your identification decision? 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Not at all Totally 
certain certain 
*Note that all witnesses were shown the original lineup as well as their actual responses when answering these 
questions 
